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ARTICLES 
BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED 
Nicholas Almendares* & Catherine Hafer** 
 
The doctrine announced in Citizens United rendered most efforts to 
regulate campaign financing unconstitutional.  We argue, however, that the 
doctrine allows for a novel approach to the concerns inherent in campaign 
financing that does not directly infringe on political speech, because it 
operates later in the process, after the election.  This approach allows us to 
address a broad range of these issues and to do so with legal tools that are 
readily available. 
We describe two applications of our approach in this Article.  First, we 
argue that courts should use a modified rational basis review when a law 
implicates the interests of a major campaign contributor.  The nature of the 
inquiry remains the same—the law only needs to serve some public 
purpose—but the standard is modified to be less deferential, because the 
campaign spending undermines the democratic accountability rationale 
behind that deference.  Second, we argue that some of the key goals of 
campaign finance regulation can be realized through institutional design of 
the policymaking process, which has far fewer constitutional limits than 
campaign finance regulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Citizens United v. FEC,1 the Supreme Court announced a very 
exacting constitutional standard for any campaign finance regulation, 
thereby eliminating the primary tool that had been relied on to cope with the 
varied problems caused by money in politics.  After Citizens United, any 
law that restricts campaign spending must be directed toward a narrowly 
construed anticorruption interest that is defined solely in terms of quid pro 
quo exchanges of policy for campaign funds.  The result of this is that there 
is now an array of ways that money influences policymaking that cannot be 
addressed or regulated in the conventional way.  One of our goals in this 
Article is to present a reading of Citizens United that illustrates its limits. 
We further argue that Citizens United leaves open the possibility for a 
novel approach to managing the pernicious effects of money in politics.  
While conventional campaign finance regulation tries to mute the policy 
influence of money by reducing the amount used in campaigns, the 
approach we advocate here focuses on the policymaking process that 
follows the election.  Because our “downstream” approach to these issues 
entails no restriction on political speech, it is permissible under Citizens 
United. 
The account of corruption in Citizens United, reaffirmed by McCutcheon 
v. FEC,2 excluded any discussion of access, influence, or favoritism 
stemming from campaign financing.  Moreover, the Court concluded—
apparently as a matter of constitutional law—that independent campaign 
expenditures cannot corrupt elected officials where there is no coordination 
between the donors3 and the candidate. 
A broad reading of Citizens United is at odds with Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co.,4 decided that same Term.  Caperton held that 
independent expenditures could influence an elected judge, requiring 
recusal when his benefactor had a stake in the case.  Despite there being no 
quid pro quo, concerns that the judge would feel beholden to someone who 
had been instrumental in getting him elected, or simply the appearance that 
the judge was beholden, motivated the Caperton decision.  Citizens United 
 
 1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 2. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
 3. Here and throughout, we use words like “donor” and “contributor” broadly to 
include those who make independent expenditures on behalf of a candidate, either in support 
of that candidate or in opposition to her opponents.  In light of the current law, independent 
expenditures rather than direct contributions will be more central to our discussion. 
 4. 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
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also seems at odds with a large body of social science research 
demonstrating that policymakers are sensitive to political spending and 
highlighting the subtle effects of money in politics. 
However, Citizens United should not be read too broadly; it does not 
completely prevent courts and lawmakers from addressing a variety of 
issues caused by campaign financing, although it does restrict the means 
available to do so.  We argue that the Court’s narrow understanding of 
corruption and the anticorruption interest should be read as a term of art that 
designates only this special quid pro quo in cases where speech is limited.  
This reading harmonizes Citizens United with Caperton, the social science 
literature, and previous holdings of the Court.  It also opens the door to our 
novel approach to mitigating the effects that money has on policymaking. 
In this Article, we describe two specific applications of our approach.  
First, we suggest that courts should engage in a modified rational basis 
review of policies enacted by elected officials, triggered when the interests 
of a major campaign contributor are implicated.  On the face of it, this 
proposal may appear demanding, as it requires a nonquestion-begging 
rubric that distinguishes undue or disproportionate influence arising from 
campaign spending and the ordinary practice of politics.  Caperton, 
however, lists a series of factors for determining when there is a serious risk 
that an elected official will be biased in favor of a campaign benefactor, and 
that case can be used as a model for a threshold inquiry.  If that threshold is 
met, then the court should conduct a form of rational basis review—a due 
process test which requires there to be a legitimate government interest that 
the policy furthers.  The key difference between our proposal and ordinary 
rational basis review is that the policy would not enjoy the “strong 
presumption of validity”5 to which it is usually entitled.  That presumption 
is based on the belief that the democratic process will correct most policies 
that the electorate thinks are not in its interest.  When the threshold inquiry–
borrowed from the multifactor test in Caperton—is satisfied, however, 
there are good reasons to believe the democratic process is not functioning 
well, thereby undermining the rationale for giving the policy a strong 
presumption of validity.  In such cases, democratic accountability is an 
inadequate check, and this should inform the judiciary’s treatment of the 
policy.  In this way, modified rational basis review captures the principles 
of United States v. Carolene Products6—namely, that courts should 
intervene when, and only when, the political process has broken down—
and in a way that can be applied relatively easily and consistently by the 
courts. 
Our second proposal turns to the institutional design of the policymaking 
process.  While it has long been understood that the details of political 
institutions may affect policy outcomes, present-day discussions of 
campaign finance regulation rarely, if ever, consider the implications of 
 
 5. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993); see also 
infra notes 154–60 and accompanying text. 
 6. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
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institutional design.  We argue that this omission is an oversight and focus 
on two principles of institutional design, the implementation of which can 
help achieve the ends of campaign finance regulation, albeit via a different 
means.  The first of these principles derives from a key Madisonian idea 
that a broader basis of political accountability—a larger and more varied 
constituency—leads to a greater emphasis on the policies with broader, 
more universal appeal and lower chances of policy capture by small, narrow 
segments of the electorate.  An important implication of this idea is that, at 
least with respect to policies that are important and salient to the national 
electorate, well-endowed special interests should find it more challenging to 
take control of policymaking within presidentially controlled administrative 
agencies than within congressional committees.  This suggests a special 
advantage that executive control of policy has over and above congressional 
control.  The second principle also relates to the basis of accountability.  
While political accountability may, in principle, promote democratic self-
government, when some interests are systematically better organized than 
others and the policy is not especially important to the public at large, it 
also can allow for capture of the policymaking process.  In such cases, 
institutional design choices that promote agency independence—such as 
removal protections—and insulate the agency from political interference 
may be particularly attractive bulwarks against moneyed special interests.  
Both of these institutional design principles can help diminish the effects of 
money on policy outcomes, paralleling campaign finance regulation. 
A fundamental aspect of our approach is that it does not entail 
overturning or modifying Citizens United, or any of the current campaign 
finance jurisprudence.  Instead, we take the extant doctrine as given and 
base our constructive proposals on well-established legal tools and familiar 
practices.  The approach we advocate is thus feasible both constitutionally 
and practically.  Indeed, one of the goals of this Article is to show what can 
be done after Citizens United with the legal tools readily available to us.  
Furthermore, we argue that, while our institutional proposals and doctrinal 
arguments do increase the authority of unelected government actors, they 
do not so much constrain democratic self-governance as enable it.7 
The balance of this Article consists of five parts.  Part I describes the 
Supreme Court’s current campaign finance jurisprudence.  Part II explains 
the limits of this doctrine, showing that it permits creative responses to 
campaign financing so long as such responses do not directly infringe on 
political speech.  This part also discusses the relationship between money 
and policymaking.  Parts III and IV each present an example of our 
downstream, ex post approach to regulating campaign financing:  Part III 
argues that courts are empowered to address campaign financing through 
modified rational basis review, and Part IV outlines the proposals based on 
the institutional design of agencies.  Finally, Part V evaluates the 
consequences of modified rational basis review and our institutional design 
ideas with regard to U.S. democracy. 
 
 7. See infra Part V. 
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I.  THE CURRENT STATE OF 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE JURISPRUDENCE 
In this part, we present the campaign finance doctrine and provide the 
necessary background to situate Citizens United and its rationale in context.  
First Amendment doctrine holds that the money spent in a campaign is 
considered speech.8  So, the resources used in campaigns are equated with 
the television ads, et cetera, that they often fund, which implies that they are 
“core” political speech9 entitled to very substantial First Amendment 
protections.10  As the Supreme Court reiterated: 
There is no right more basic in our democracy than the right to participate 
in electing our political leaders.  Citizens can exercise that right in a 
variety of ways:  [t]hey can run for office themselves, vote, urge others to 
vote for a particular candidate, volunteer to work on a campaign, and 
contribute to a candidate’s campaign.11 
Unlike “time, place, and manner” restrictions on speech, campaign finance 
regulation is held to the demanding standard of strict scrutiny,12 which 
requires that the law or regulation “furthers a compelling interest and is 
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”13 
The standard thus consists of two parts.  First, there must be a good 
reason for the restriction—that is, a problem to be solved; and second, the 
solution cannot be over- or underinclusive.  The regulation should not, for 
example, burden too much other, nonproblematic speech.  This is the same 
standard used for restrictions of speech that are not deemed content 
neutral,14 i.e., when the regulation favors one perspective over another.  
While the statement usually is made categorically—all laws that directly 
 
 8. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010). But see Nixon v. Shrink Mo. 
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Money is property; it is not 
speech.”); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 508 (1985) 
(White, J., dissenting); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution:  Is Money Speech?, 
85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976). 
 9. Consider Justice Scalia’s comment in McConnell: 
This is a sad day for the freedom of speech.  Who could have imagined that the 
same Court which, within the past four years, has sternly disapproved of 
restrictions upon such inconsequential forms of expression as virtual child 
pornography, tobacco advertising, dissemination of illegally intercepted 
communications, and sexually explicit cable programming, would smile with favor 
upon a law that cuts to the heart of what the First Amendment is meant to protect:  
the right to criticize the government. 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 248 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. 
 10. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976); see also Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. 
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (“[T]he First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent 
application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.” (citing Monitor Patriot 
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971))). 
 11. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1440–41 (2014). 
 12. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (quoting FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 
449, 464 (2007)). 
 13. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 464. 
 14. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
530, 540 (1980) (“Where a government restricts the speech of a private person, the state 
action may be sustained only if the government can show that the regulation is a precisely 
drawn means of serving a compelling state interest.”). 
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burden political speech are subject to strict scrutiny15—the Court has 
sometimes explained that the higher standard is justified by the fact that 
campaign finance regulations frequently function more like a ban on speech 
than a time, place, and manner restriction.  Given the complexity of 
campaign finance regulation, an individual or entity seeking to participate 
in a campaign is often put in the position of consulting Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) guidelines (which are themselves often opaque) or else 
risk substantial penalties.  This puts the FEC in essentially the role of a 
censor, issuing licenses determining who can and cannot participate in the 
campaign, circumstances that the First Amendment was designed to 
avoid.16  The Supreme Court consistently is narrowly divided in these 
cases, however, with dissenting opinions disagreeing as to whether the 
campaign finance regulation should be treated with the more lenient 
standard accorded to content-neutral time, place, and manner of speech 
restrictions.17 
A.  Buckley:  Differentiating Between Contributions 
and Independent Expenditures 
Any discussion of campaign finance jurisprudence properly begins with 
Buckley v. Valeo,18 which continues to define the law.  Buckley considered 
the constitutional implications of the 1974 amendments to the Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 197119 (FECA).  Central to Buckley and its 
lasting influence is the famous (or infamous) distinction between direct 
contributions to a candidate’s campaign and independent expenditures in 
favor of that candidate.20 
While acknowledging the central role that money plays in enabling 
speech, the Court held that contribution limits imposed less of a burden on 
speech than expenditure limits did.21  A contribution, to the extent it is 
 
 15. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003), overruled on other grounds 
by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (requiring a compelling state interest to justify the burden 
on First Amendment expression); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 
652, 658 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (“Although 
these requirements do not stifle corporate speech entirely, they do burden expressive 
activity . . . .  Thus, they must be justified by a compelling state interest.”). 
 16. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 335–36. 
 17. See, e.g., id. at 393–94 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 
419 (“In many ways, then, § 203 [of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002] 
functions as a source restriction or a time, place, and manner restriction.”). 
 18. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 19. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). 
 20. While an independent expenditure may support a given candidate, the candidate has 
had no input in how it is spent.  Later decisions have treated expenditures that are 
coordinated with the candidate’s campaign as roughly equivalent to a direct contribution, 
posing analogous risks of corruption and so could be limited accordingly. See, e.g., FEC v. 
Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colo. Republican II), 533 U.S. 431, 438, 457–61 
(2001); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46 (“[C]ontrolled or coordinated expenditures are treated as 
contributions rather than expenditures under the [Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971].”).  When we speak of expenditures, we generally refer to independent ones. 
 21. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. 
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expressive in and of itself, conveys only a very rough message of support.  
It expresses a message in favor of the candidate but does not identify which 
of her views the contributor endorses or for what reasons.  So, the direct 
impact of contribution limits on speech—the constraint of this sort of 
symbolic expression—is fairly small.22  Further, to the extent that campaign 
contributions enable speech by another, FECA’s contribution limit only 
burdens the ability to speak by proxy.  An individual’s right to speak her 
own opinions or on her own behalf is not restricted.23  Speech one step 
removed, then, is entitled to less constitutional protection.  All told, 
contribution limits face a substantial, but not insurmountable, constitutional 
burden. 
The Court also concluded that FECA’s primary purpose, to limit 
corruption or the appearance of corruption, was a sufficiently compelling 
government interest to justify the restrictions on speech entailed in 
contribution limits.  The Court held that contribution limits could be 
justified in order to prevent arrangements where large campaign donations 
are effectively translated into favorable policies by the newly elected 
official: 
The increasing importance of the communications media and 
sophisticated mass-mailing and polling operations to effective 
campaigning make the raising of large sums of money an ever more 
essential ingredient of an effective candidacy.  To the extent that large 
contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current 
and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative 
democracy is undermined.24 
FECA’s contribution limits were held to be constitutional based on the 
compelling government interest of preventing “buying votes.”25  Moreover, 
this compelling government interest extended to preventing the appearance 
that these sorts of exchanges were happening:  “Of almost equal concern as 
the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the 
appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the 
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial 
contributions.”26  So, the anticorruption interest relied on in Buckley can be 
thought of as consisting of two closely related parts:  (1)  avoiding actual 
trades of campaign contributions for policy concessions, and (2)  avoiding 
the appearance of such trades.  A similar anticorruption interest had been 
relied on by the Supreme Court to uphold statutes banning civil service 
employees from participating in political campaigns.27 
 
 22. Id. at 20–21. 
 23. Id. at 21 (“While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a 
candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions 
into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor.”). 
 24. Id. at 26–27 (emphasis added). 
 25. Id. at 70. 
 26. Id. at 27. 
 27. See, e.g., United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). 
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The anticorruption interest relied on in Buckley is prophylactic.28  The 
rationale is not that all substantial contributions are quid pro quo exchanges, 
nor that they will appear as such.  It would be extremely difficult, though, to 
distinguish which contributions were quid pro quo exchanges, or looked 
that way, and which were not.  A legislator who receives large contributions 
from an industry and then sponsors legislation favorable to it might be an 
archetypal instance of a quid pro quo, or she might sincerely believe that the 
proposed law would benefit her constituency, possibly on the basis of 
information not readily available to the general public.29  These motivations 
are not mutually exclusive.  Policies that benefit the industry might benefit 
the legislator’s home district for that very reason, especially if the industry 
is a sizable part of the local economy.  Laws directly addressing quid pro 
quo exchanges, such as a statute outlawing them (basically an analogue to 
antibribery statutes), would be extremely difficult to enforce, making some 
form of campaign finance regulation one of the few tools suited to the task. 
The government’s anticorruption interest was not deemed sufficient to 
justify limits on independent expenditures, though, because the Court held 
that expenditure limits entail a greater restraint on speech.30  While 
contributions are, at best, a vague message of support from the 
contributor—amounting mostly to speech by proxy and therefore entitled to 
less First Amendment protection—an independent expenditure is an 
instance of direct speech.  In addition, the Court held that independent 
expenditures do not present the same risks of corruption:  “The absence of 
prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or 
his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, 
but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro 
quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”31  Therefore, Buckley 
 
 28. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 n.5 (2000); FEC v. Nat’l Right 
to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982) (“Nor will we second-guess a legislative 
determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil to be 
feared.”); accord FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500 
(1985). 
 29. This is one way the legislator’s choices could very much appear to be a quid pro quo 
to the public, while actually being a policy choice that is in the best interests of the public.  
This sort of behavior can be contrasted with “pandering,” when a lawmaker enacts policies 
she knows (on the basis superior information) are not in the public interest, but that the 
public, which lacks specialized information, believes would be better for them. See Brandice 
Canes-Wrone, Michael C. Herron & Kenneth W. Shotts, Leadership and Pandering:  A 
Theory of Executive Policymaking, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 532, 533 (2001); Canice Prendergast, 
A Theory of “Yes Men”, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 757, 769–70 (1993). 
 30. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–45. 
 31. Id. at 47.  This conclusion by the Court is not without its critics, especially in light of 
the post-Buckley history. See, e.g., BURT NEUBORNE, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE REFORM & THE CONSTITUTION:  A CRITICAL LOOK AT BUCKLEY V. VALEO 16 (1998), 
http://brennan.3cdn.net/f124fc7ebf928fb019_hqm6bn3w0.pdf  (stating that the possibility 
that independent expenditures may corrupt just as contributions do “is where the Buckley 
Court suffers most from having been without a factual record.  Enormous independent 
expenditures were not part of the fictional record the Court considered, mostly because they 
were not yet part of America’s political process.  Several scholars, reflecting on the millions 
of dollars independently spent in the 1996 elections, have called for a factually based study 
of independent expenditures’ potential for corruption”) [https://perma.cc/D3GF-2SR5]. 
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holds that there are two problems with limiting independent expenditures:  
first, they place a greater burden on free speech, and second, the 
anticorruption interest does not apply to them.  In the Buckley Court’s view, 
the same rationale that made limits on campaign contributions 
constitutional cannot apply to independent expenditures.32  The observation 
that independent expenditures count as a more important and direct form of 
speech indicates that even if it were shown that they do facilitate quid pro 
quo exchanges, the First Amendment might still disallow limiting them 
because the constitutional bar in this instance is higher than it is for 
campaign contributions. 
Buckley, then, stands for two enduring propositions.  First, contributions 
and expenditures are treated differently:  independent expenditures are 
entitled to substantially more constitutional protection than direct 
contributions receive.  Second, the government has a compelling interest in 
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, understood as a trade 
of campaign funds for favorable political activity.  Although Buckley did 
leave open the possibility of other compelling government interests, it 
rejected the proposed government interest of equalizing the capacity for all 
individuals to engage in political speech, finding it incompatible with the 
First Amendment.33  Despite having no shortage of critics,34 the Buckley 
framework has proven durable.  While a number of justices have expressed 
a willingness to abandon the framework,35 especially its distinction between 
contributions and independent expenditures,36 it repeatedly has been 
reaffirmed.37 
 
 32. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–45. 
 33. Id. at 48–49. 
 34. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of 
Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 743, 747 (2007) (“[I]t’s hard to think of a line that has been 
subjected to more withering criticism over the years than Buckley’s expenditure/contribution 
distinction.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 265–66 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting, 
joined by Scalia, J.); id. at 274 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I am convinced that Buckley’s 
holding on expenditures limits is wrong, and that the time has come to overrule it.”); Colo. 
Republican II, 533 U.S. 431, 465 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J. and 
Kennedy, J.) (“I continue to believe that Buckley v. Valeo should be overruled.” (citations 
omitted)); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 409 (2000) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (“I would overrule Buckley and then free Congress or state legislatures to attempt 
some new reform, if, based upon their own considered view of the First Amendment, it is 
possible to do so.”); id. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.); Colo. 
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colo. Republican I), 518 U.S. 604, 631 (1996) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and 
Scalia, J.) (“I would reject the framework established by Buckley v. Valeo.”). 
 36. See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE 
LAW OF DEMOCRACY 363 (3d ed. 2007) (“After Colorado Republican I, there was a clear 
majority of votes on the Supreme Court to overturn Buckley.”); Karlan, supra note 34, at 748 
(“One thing that [Randall v. Sorrell] showed is that the expenditure/contribution distinction 
is now the sick man of constitutional doctrine.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. 377; Colo. Republican II, 533 U.S. 431; Austin v. 
Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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B.  Campaign Finance Doctrine Post-Citizens United 
Citizens United substantially narrowed the field for constitutionally 
permissible campaign finance regulation by reversing a trend toward an 
expansive definition of the anticorruption interest endorsed by Buckley and 
subsequent cases.38  Although the case’s treatment of corporations—and its 
holding that the corporate identity of the speaker does not diminish or alter 
its free speech rights39—has received more attention,40 the Court also 
adopted a very specific reading of the anticorruption interest and dismissed 
other potential compelling state interests that could serve to justify 
campaign finance regulation.  Put simply, the Court left only one extant 
compelling state interest in this context, the anticorruption interest, and 
construed it narrowly to include only quid pro quo exchanges. 
In doing so, Citizens United explicitly overruled Austin v. Michigan State 
Chamber of Commerce41 and those sections of McConnell v. FEC42 that 
relied on it.  Austin had upheld a prohibition on independent expenditures 
by corporations,43 concluding that the statute was designed to combat 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.44  However, the Austin majority 
acknowledged that the form of corruption relevant to that case differed from 
the sort referenced in Buckley.45  Rather than viewing corruption as a quid 
pro quo exchange,46 the corruption identified in Austin was “the corrosive 
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are 
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no 
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”47  
Austin held that this sort of distortion of the political marketplace qualified 
 
 38. To be sure, the doctrinal shift in the Citizens United majority did not spring out of 
nowhere.  The arguments in that case were presented in previous cases, notably Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion in McConnell. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 291–98 (2003), 
overruled on other grounds by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (Kennedy, J, concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part).  That opinion, where Justice Kennedy partially 
concurred in the judgment and partially dissented, was joined in its entirety by only one 
other justice, and two others joined it to some degree. Id. at 286 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).  The majority in McConnell articulated a quite 
different understanding of the anticorruption interest. See infra notes 51–52 and 
accompanying text.  Citizens United extended this line of reasoning and, crucially, moved it 
to the majority of the Court. 
 39. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342–43 (“The identity of the speaker is not decisive in 
determining whether speech is protected.” (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion))). 
 40. See, e.g., Editorial, The Court’s Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/opinion/22fri1.html (“The majority is deeply wrong on 
the law.  Most wrongheaded of all is its insistence that corporations are just like people and 
entitled to the same First Amendment rights.”) [https://perma.cc/R7SZ-BLZ5]. 
 41. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 42. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 43. The corporations still could set up Political Action Committees (PACs) in order to 
make independent expenditures; they were just barred from using their general funds to do 
so. Austin, 494 U.S. at 669 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 44. Id. at 658–59 (majority opinion). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 659. 
 47. Id. at 660. 
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as corruption, a judgment Citizens United reversed.48  McConnell,49 which 
upheld Congress’s ban on soft money,50 also conceived of corruption in 
broad terms, stating bluntly:  “[P]laintiffs conceive of corruption too 
narrowly.  Our cases have firmly established that Congress’[s] legitimate 
interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to 
curbing ‘undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance 
of such influence.’”51  McConnell made it clear that this sort of influence 
also constituted corruption and was just as much of a threat to democracy as 
the quid pro quo exchanges relied on in Buckley.52 
Citizens United, in contrast, defined corruption exclusively in the terms 
of the quid pro quo exchanges described in Buckley.53  Special or 
disproportionate influence, like the sorts described in Austin and 
McConnell, was excluded from this definition of corruption.54  Citing 
Buckley, the Court also excluded independent expenditures, concluding that 
the anticorruption interest could not be relied on to regulate them.55  
McCutcheon followed suit, holding that any campaign finance regulation 
must “target . . . a direct exchange of an official act for money.”56  Thus, as 
understood by contemporary campaign finance jurisprudence, corruption 
involves an “act akin to bribery.”57  Consequently, the Court rejected the 
idea that large contributions can be inherently corrupting, arguing that such 
 
 48. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010) (“All speakers, including 
individuals and the media, use money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their 
speech.  The First Amendment protects the resulting speech, even if it was enabled by 
economic transactions with persons or entities who disagree with the speaker’s ideas.”). 
 49. Parts of McConnell were overruled by Citizens United because they were based on 
Austin.  Those sections pertained to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s (BCRA or 
“McCain-Feingold”) electioneering communication provisions, not those pertaining to soft 
money. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 322, 365–66; see also id. at 412 (Stevens, J., dissenting 
in part and concurring in part) (noting that the soft money ban remains in place post-Citizens 
United). 
 50. Soft money generally refers to money given to political parties intended to influence 
state or local elections that could then be repurposed to affect federal races in mixed-purpose 
activities, such as general party or issue advertisements, or organization efforts that affect 
both local and federal campaigns.  Prior to BCRA, soft money was a way to work around 
campaign finance contribution limits. 
 51. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 150 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 
558 U.S. 310.  Justice Breyer’s dissent in McCutcheon likewise casts the anticorruption 
interest in comprehensive terms:  “The anticorruption interest that drives Congress to 
regulate campaign contributions is a far broader, more important interest than the plurality 
acknowledges.  It is an interest in maintaining the integrity of our public governmental 
institutions.” McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1466–67 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 52. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 153; see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1468–70 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (summarizing these claims). 
 53. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (citations omitted); see also FEC v. Nat’l 
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (“The hallmark of 
corruption is the financial quid pro quo:  dollars for political favors.”). 
 54. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359–61. 
 55. Id. at 357 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)). 
 56. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 57. Id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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a definition “dangerously broadens the circumscribed definition of quid pro 
quo corruption articulated in our prior cases.”58 
While adopting a narrow reading of the anticorruption interest, Citizens 
United simultaneously dismissed other potential compelling government 
interests.  First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti59 had left open the 
possibility that protecting shareholders from, in effect, being forced to 
subsidize advocacy they might disagree with might serve as a sufficiently 
compelling government interest.  When a corporation uses its resources in a 
campaign, it is using the shareholders’ property to that end.  If the 
corporation is one designed for express political purposes—such as a 
Political Action Committee (PAC)—then the situation is straightforward:  
anyone not interested in that organization’s message simply should not 
invest in it.  The same cannot be assumed for a run of the mill for-profit 
corporation with no express political ties.60  Bellotti held that corporate 
bylaws and the threat of derivative suits likely would protect shareholders 
from having their investments co-opted for stances they found 
disagreeable61 and that there was no evidence presented that this risk of 
shareholder coercion was real and widespread.62  Citizens United then 
altogether foreclosed protecting shareholders in this manner as a compelling 
interest because doing so would permit the government to ban the political 
speech of media corporations (e.g., newspapers) as well as other kinds of 
corporations.  The Court also reiterated Bellotti’s conclusion that there were 
ways to resolve this issue that did not tread on political speech.63 
Post-Citizens United, there exists only one compelling government 
interest recognized by the Supreme Court as capable of supporting 
conventional, ex ante campaign finance regulation:  preventing corruption 
or the appearance of corruption.  The Court in McCutcheon underscored 
this holding, stating:  “We have consistently rejected attempts to suppress 
campaign speech based on other legislative objectives.”64  While it is 
possible that other compelling government interests may be recognized in 
future cases, at present there is only the anticorruption interest, an interest 
that the Court has construed narrowly. 
 
 58. Id. at 1460 (majority opinion). 
 59. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 60. Id. at 804–06 (White, J., dissenting). 
 61. Id. at 794 (majority opinion). 
 62. Id. at 794 n.34. 
 63. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010).  The Court also held that the 
specific statutes in question were not narrowly tailored to this purpose. Id. 
 64. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014).  The opinion of the Court in 
McCutcheon was a plurality, authored by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by three other 
justices.  Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, but would go further and overrule 
Buckley. See id. at 1463–64 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer wrote a dissent. 
The Court has made this statement in previous cases as well:  “We held in Buckley and 
reaffirmed in Citizens Against Rent Control that preventing corruption or the appearance of 
corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for 
restricting campaign finances.” FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 
480, 496–97 (1985); see also Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 
658 (1990) (quoting Nat’l Conservative Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 496–97), overruled by 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. 
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Although most commentary has focused on the increased corporate 
money that Citizens United has let into campaigns, the doctrinal shift 
described in this section is arguably more important.65  We have focused on 
it in part because it directly affects future attempts to enact campaign 
finance regulation, and also because the impact of Citizens United on the 
amount of corporate money allowed into political campaigns is actually 
fairly modest.  The floodgates that Citizens United opened were already 
rather porous.  FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.66 (WRTL II) already had 
cleared the way for corporate money to enter into campaigns by striking 
down section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 200267 
(BCRA), also known as McCain-Feingold, which forbade corporations 
from using their general treasury funds (i.e., funds not belonging to the 
corporation’s PAC) for “express advocacy” for a candidate in the run-up to 
an election, while allowing “issue advocacy,” distinguishing between the 
two based on whether a candidate for office was mentioned in the ad.68  
Under WRTL II, so long as there is some small amount of ambiguity as to 
whether the ad takes a stance on an issue rather than solely on a specific 
candidate, the ad is entitled to the benefit of the doubt and cannot be 
restricted.  The immediate tangible effect that Citizens United had on 
corporate money in campaigns per se was simply to allow corporations to 
be more blatant about their campaign activities.69 
II.  THE LIMITS OF CITIZENS UNITED 
As we saw in the previous part, Citizens United singles out combating 
corruption as the only government interest sufficiently compelling to justify 
the restrictions of speech that regulating political spending entails.  Further, 
it (and McCutcheon following it) defines corruption narrowly as only quid 
pro quo exchanges of funds for policy.  Other effects of spending money to 
help a candidate’s campaign, such as increased access and the opportunity 
to lobby her if she wins,70 are excluded from the ambit of corruption.  
According to the Court, this definition also implies that independent 
expenditures are incapable of corrupting elected officials. 
The Court’s treatment of corruption and the closely linked anticorruption 
interest raises a number of questions.  If read broadly, Citizens United 
might suggest that, as a matter of constitutional law, the government only 
 
 65. Our approach is not unique. See generally Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign 
Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 66. 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007). 
 67. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81. 
 68. WRTL II struck down section 203 as overbroad, holding that “a court should find 
that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no 
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.” 
Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2667.  The Court explained that safeguarding the 
freedom of speech requires standards that “give the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather 
than stifling speech.” Id. 
 69. Kang, supra note 65, at 3–4. 
 70. See Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, Is It Whom You 
Know or What You Know?  An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process, 104 AM. 
ECON. REV. 3885 (2014). 
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has authority to regulate activities that facilitate quid pro quo exchanges.  
The understanding of corruption stated in Citizens United might, for 
instance, prompt a reexamination of the Hatch Act71 (formally known as 
“An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities”), which bars 
government employees from some sorts of political activity and was 
enacted, in part, to “prevent corruption.”72  Along similar lines, by defining 
independent expenditures as not corrupting, the Supreme Court seems to 
imply that they are not actionable in a crucial, constitutionally relevant 
sense.  A natural reading of Citizens United is that it says something 
fundamental about elected officials, or perhaps how the Constitution sees 
them.  This image of elected officials and corruption would have a number 
of implications for campaign finance law, not the least of which is the 
constitutional status of the provisions of BCRA still in place,73 and 
potentially extending into other areas of law. 
In this part, we explain that such a reading of the case is overbroad.  As 
we argue in Part II.A, that reading is at odds with the underlying logic of 
Caperton, if not precisely with its holding, which was decided only months 
before Citizens United with a majority opinion also authored by Justice 
Kennedy.  Caperton concluded that independent expenditures could, in 
some cases, affect the decisions of elected officials.  Furthermore, as we 
discuss in Part II.B, the social science literature and Supreme Court 
precedent show that money can affect policymaking in a variety of ways, 
some of them quite subtle.  In other words, the quid pro quos focused on in 
Citizens United only cover a small portion of the effects of political 
spending.  The broadest reading of the doctrine in Citizens United would 
seem to render all of these campaign financing activities not only 
unregulated but also immune to regulation.  In Part II.C, we defend a more 
circumscribed reading of the case.  Citizens United’s narrow definition of 
corruption and the anticorruption interest binds only when the challenged 
law or policy restricts core, political speech.  Regulations that do not limit 
speech are not required to be closely tailored to that narrowly defined 
government interest and do not have to fit into the small safe harbor 
provided for by the First Amendment.  Although such regulations face their 
own constitutional limits, if they do not conflict with the First Amendment, 
then Citizens United’s demanding standard of corruption does not apply. 
A.  Caperton and Citizens United 
In Caperton, a West Virginia jury had found the A.T. Massey Coal 
Company and its affiliates liable for $50 million in compensatory and 
 
 71. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1508 (2000) (covering state and local employees); 5 U.S.C. 7321–
7326 (covering federal employees). 
 72. See Jason C. Miller, The Unwise and Unconstitutional Hatch Act:  Why State and 
Local Government Employees Should Be Free to Run for Public Office, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
313, 346 (2010) (alteration in original). 
 73. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1466 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 412 & n.22 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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punitive damages.74  West Virginia held its judicial elections before the 
case could be heard on appeal, and Don Blankenship, Massey’s Chairman, 
Chief Executive Officer, and President, chose to support Brent Benjamin in 
his campaign against one of the incumbents on the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals, which was set to hear the upcoming appeal.75  
Blankenship contributed the $1000 statutory maximum to Benjamin’s 
campaign committee, nearly $2.5 million to a political organization that 
backed Benjamin, and spent over $500,000 in independent expenditures 
supporting him as well.76  All told, Blankenship spent approximately $3 
million in support of Benjamin.77  To put this figure in context, 
Blankenship spent more than all of Benjamin’s other supporters combined, 
three times the amount spent by Benjamin’s own election committee,78 and 
in excess of $1 million more than both candidates’ campaign committees 
combined.79  Benjamin won the election with a 53 percent vote share, or by 
about 400,000 votes.80 
Massey’s appeal then came before a panel of five justices, and Caperton 
moved to disqualify the newly elected Justice Benjamin based on the 
conflict of interest caused by Blankenship’s involvement in the campaign.81  
This motion was denied, and the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
reversed the jury verdict against Massey in a 3-2 decision.82  A closely 
divided Supreme Court ruled that Benjamin’s decision not to recuse himself 
violated due process.  The Court held that a judge must be recused if an 
average judge in these circumstances likely would be biased.83  The 
relevant question is not whether this particular judge was actually biased or 
not.  The inquiry is more general and abstract: 
Not every campaign contribution by a litigant or attorney creates a 
probability of bias that requires a judge’s recusal, but this is an 
exceptional case.  We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual bias—
based on objective and reasonable perceptions—when a person with a 
personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate 
influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the 
judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.  The 
inquiry centers on the contribution’s relative size in comparison to the 
total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total amount 
spent in the election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on the 
outcome of the election.84 
 
 74. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009). 
 75. Id. at 873. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 873–74. 
 82. Id. at 874. 
 83. Id. at 881 (“The inquiry is an objective one.  The Court asks not whether the judge is 
actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in this position is ‘likely’ to be 
neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’”). 
 84. Id. at 884 (citations omitted). 
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The Court found that the size of Blankenship’s contributions and their 
timing85 was enough to warrant recusal in this case. 
Caperton’s “serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and 
reasonable perceptions”—looks very similar to the idea of corruption that 
has played such a central role in campaign finance jurisprudence.86  As one 
opinion puts it:  “Corruption is a subversion of the political process.  
Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office 
by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into 
their campaigns.”87  This formulation of corruption as being an inducement 
to disregard the obligations of their office nearly is identical to the bias 
standard relied on in Caperton.  Moreover, both standards consider 
appearance to be sufficient.  The anticorruption interest includes avoiding 
the appearance of corruption, whether or not it actually occurs,88 while in 
Caperton it does not matter whether the judge in question actually is biased, 
but rather whether such a perception is, under the circumstances of the case, 
reasonable. 
Three other features of Caperton are worth highlighting.  First, the risk of 
actual bias warranted recusal despite the fact that there was no evidence or 
even an allegation of a quid pro quo.89  Second, this recusal was a way of 
addressing worries raised from campaign financing that did not involve 
restricting any protected political speech.90  Third, Blankenship’s 
involvement in the campaign overwhelmingly and almost exclusively 
consisted of independent expenditures.  Of the $3 million Blankenship 
spent supporting Benjamin, a paltry $1000, or less than one-tenth of 1 
percent, was in the form of direct contributions.  So, Blankenship’s 
“extraordinary efforts” to help Benjamin get elected create enough of a 
worry that Benjamin would feel a “debt of gratitude” to constitute a due 
process violation,91 and these efforts were made up practically entirely of 
independent expenditures. 
In Citizens United, though, independent expenditures were held not to 
“lead to, or create the appearance of quid pro quo corruption,”92 and 
consequently they could not be restricted.  A broad reading of Citizens 
United—one that understands the Court to be saying that nothing other than 
quid pro quos are appropriate targets of regulation—cannot be reconciled 
with Caperton.  Moreover, Caperton illustrates that independent 
expenditures can have tangible effects on elected officials and that the 
 
 85. Id. at 886 (“The temporal relationship between the campaign contributions, the 
justice’s elections, and the pendency of the case is also critical.  It was reasonably 
foreseeable, when the campaign contributions were made, that the pending case would be 
before the newly elected justice.”). 
 86. Id. at 884. 
 87. FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985); 
accord FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 156 (2003) (referring to corruption as “undue 
influence on an officeholder’s judgment”). 
 88. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
 89. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886. 
 90. See infra notes 128–31 and accompanying text. 
 91. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 882. 
 92. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010). 
2016] BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED 2771 
Constitution at least sometimes permits the government to respond to them.  
Indeed, in Caperton that response comes from the courts, an element it 
shares in common with the modified rational basis review we argue for in 
Part III.  Put another way, Caperton indicates that Citizens United’s 
doctrine has limits, which we outline in Part II.C below. 
B.  The Political Economy of Campaign Financing 
Earlier Supreme Court cases have found substantial evidence that 
campaign funding influences elected officials, even if that influence may 
not constitute quid pro quo corruption as understood in Citizens United.  
McConnell is a particularly clear example of this:  the trial court found that 
while there was no evidence of vote buying or bribery, “the evidence 
presented in this case convincingly demonstrates that large 
contributions . . . provide donors access to federal lawmakers which is a 
critical ingredient for influencing legislation.”93  Judge Kollar-Kotelly, 
citing a lobbyist’s testimony,94 also concluded that an “effective advertising 
campaign may have far more effect on a member than a direct campaign 
contribution or even a large soft money donation to his or her political 
party.”95  So, there was evidence not only that independent expenditures 
had an impact on candidates for office, but also evidence that this effect was 
large.96  A majority of the Supreme Court also agreed on these points, 
concluding that both soft money97 and independent advertising98 bought 
those contributing the funds increased access to and influence over elected 
officials.  These findings of McConnell were not overruled by Citizens 
United.99  McConnell indicates that any sense that independent 
expenditures have a small or trivial effect over elected officials is mistaken. 
Social science research confirms this conclusion and identifies other 
ways that money can influence policymaking.  Numerous studies have 
concluded that campaign contributions lead to a substantial, measurable 
effect on the policies enacted,100 suggesting the presence of a market for 
 
 93. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d. 176, 481 (D.D.C. 2003) (opinion of Kollar-
Kotelly, J.). 
 94. Id. at 352 n.126 (per curiam). 
 95. Id. at 556 (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.). 
 96. Another member of the panel, Judge Leon, agreed on this point. Id. at 804–05 
(opinion of Leon, J.). But see id. at 266 (opinion of Henderson, J.) (“My colleagues’ per 
curiam opinion and their other opinions ignore the statute’s transparent infirmity and leave 
standing its most pernicious provisions, apparently on the ground that candidate-focused 
political speech inevitably ‘corrupts’ the individuals to whom it refers.”); Renne v. Geary, 
501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he prospect that voters might be 
persuaded by . . . endorsements is not a corruption of the democratic political process; it is 
the democratic political process.”). 
 97. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124–25 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. 310; see also id. at 130 (citing a Senate Committee report that “concluded 
that both parties promised and provided special access to candidates and senior Government 
officials in exchange for large soft-money contributions”); id. at 146. 
 98. Id. at 128–29. 
 99. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66. 
 100. Jonathan C. Brooks, A. Colin Cameron & Colin A. Carter, Political Action 
Committee Contributions and U.S. Congressional Voting on Sugar Legislation, 80 AM. J. 
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policy in exchange for campaign support.101  Motivated by a desire to 
influence policy, sophisticated buyers in this implicit market are looking for 
the best bargains102 and make their decisions strategically.103  This should 
come as no surprise when those actors are committing considerable 
resources to a cause.  As the lobbyist quoted above in McConnell testified:  
“Sophisticated political donors—particularly lobbyists, PAC directors, and 
other political insiders acting on behalf of specific interest groups—are not 
in the business of dispensing their money purely on ideological or 
charitable grounds. Rather, these political donors typically are trying to 
wisely invest their resources to maximize political return.”104 
By examining the relationship between a lobbyist’s compensation and 
her political connections, Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca, and Christian 
Fons-Rosen conclude that “the fact that firms and interest groups are eager 
to hire the services of well-connected individuals suggests that they expect 
a return in terms of favorable legislative outcomes.”105  The value that 
lobbying firms place on these connections is nontrivial:  from their data, 
they find that a connection to a serving senator is worth an average of a 24 
percent increase in a lobbyist’s pay, or $182,000 per year using the median 
revenue in their sample,106 while a connection to a legislator serving on a 
powerful committee corresponds to an increase of up to 45 percent of the 
 
AGRIC. ECON. 441 (1998); Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, Is Protection for 
Sale?  Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection, 82 REV. 
ECON. & STATS. 139 (2000); Kishore Gawande & Bernard Hoekman, Lobbying and 
Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States, 60 INT’L ORG. 527 (2006); Pinelopi 
Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, Protection for Sale:  An Empirical Investigation, 
89 AM. ECON. REV. 1135, 1136, 1140–42 (1999); Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 
Protection for Sale, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 833 (1994); Rigoberto A. Lopez, Campaign 
Contributions and Agricultural Subsidies, 13 ECON. & POL. 257 (2001). 
 101. Gawande & Bandyopadhyay, supra note 100, at 141–42, 147; Grossman & 
Helpman, supra note 100, at 834–35. 
 102. Gawande & Hoekman, supra note 100, at 540–42. 
 103. The notion that PACs are sophisticated actors who engage in the political process 
seeking various policy goals is widespread. See, e.g., Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman, 
Buying Time:  Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, 
84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797, 799–800 (1990). 
 104. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 555 (D.D.C. 2003) (opinion of Kollar-
Kotelly, J.).  The key alternative to this investment account of political contributions is that 
donors receive some sort of expressive or other immediate benefit from doing so.  On that 
view, donors give to campaigns not so much to influence outcomes but in order to participate 
in politics and that participation is its own reward. See Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de 
Figuerido & James M. Snyder, Jr., Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 105 (2003).  If that is the motivation for political spending, the implications 
would be quite different:  deeply unequal political expression is much less of a concern than 
grossly unequal influence over policy.  As we discuss below, however, different strands of 
theoretical and empirical scholarship have offered substantial support for the investment 
account, showing that campaign spending is motivated by affecting policy outcomes rather 
than by the inherent satisfaction of participating in the political process. Jordi Blanes i Vidal, 
Mirko Draca & Christian Fons-Rosen, Revolving Door Lobbyists, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 3731, 
3746 (2012); Sanford C. Gordon, Catherine Hafer & Dimitri Landa, Consumption or 
Investment?  On Motivations for Political Giving, 69 J. POL. 1057 (2007). 
 105. Blanes i Vidal, Draca & Fons-Rosen, supra note 104. 
 106. Id. at 3732, 3739–40. 
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lobbyist’s pay.107  As sophisticated and politically savvy actors, we would 
not expect lobbying firms to be expending large sums of money frivolously.  
Indeed, in a competitive marketplace, firms that were so wasteful—by 
systematically paying larger salaries on the basis of connections that never 
translated into benefits for the firm or its clients—would be put out of 
business by more efficient ones.108 
Most of the existing studies look at direct contributions to candidates 
rather than independent expenditures.  There are two natural reasons for 
this.  First, the environment where independent expenditures could be made 
in vast, unlimited quantities is both fairly new and in flux.109  Second, the 
data on independent expenditures does not exist in the same readily 
available way that data on direct contributions exists.110  Due to reporting 
requirements, we have accurate data about who is giving and in what 
amounts to campaigns, whereas analogous information about independently 
funded ad campaigns in favor of one candidate or another has not been as 
readily available to researchers. 
Nonetheless, the research cited here should be understood to apply to 
both independent expenditures and direct contributions.  To be sure, 
independent expenditures may be less valuable to a campaign than 
contributions:  when the campaign itself spends money, it manages the 
message, decides how to direct the resources, and so on.  From the 
candidate’s perspective, each dollar spent in independent expenditures may 
be worth less than a dollar given to her campaign.  She has more or less 
complete control over the latter and supposedly no control over the former.  
How much less efficient (again, from the candidate’s perspective)—
whether they are worth ninety cents on the dollar or forty or ten—likely 
depends on a number of factors.  Crucially, even inefficient campaign 
expenditures on a candidate’s behalf are still a net benefit to her.  And, they 
also are still valuable from the donor’s perspective:  despite their relative 
inefficiency, they still are purchasing influence over and above what they 
could with direct contributions alone because direct contributions are 
subject to limits.  Even if independent expenditures are worth less than 
 
 107. Id. at 3743. 
 108. Of course, the main targets of lobbying expenditures and beneficiaries of political 
contributions are, disproportionally, the incumbents.  As scholars of electoral competition 
have emphasized, asymmetric ability to raise money and grant favors to interested parties is 
a key source of the electoral advantage enjoyed by the incumbents. See, e.g., Scott Ashworth 
& Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Electoral Selection, Strategic Challenger Entry, and the 
Incumbency Advantage, 70 J. POL. 1006 (2008); Sanford C. Gordon, Gregory Huber & 
Dimitri Landa, Challenger Entry and Voter Learning, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 303 (2007); 
Sanford C. Gordon & Dimitri Landa, Do the Advantages of Incumbency Advantage 
Incumbents?, 71 J. POL. 1481, 1483 (2009). 
 109. The recent spending bill contains a provision vastly increasing the amount of money 
individuals can contribute to campaigns and political parties. See, e.g., Russell Berman, The 
Most Corrupting Campaign Finance Provisions Ever Enacted, ATLANTIC (Dec. 10, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/Campaign-Finance-Rider-Hidde-Inside-
Congress-New-Spending-Bill/383629/ [https://perma.cc/YZ9M-E58N]. 
 110. Although extensive disclosure rules would be constitutional. Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310, 366–71 (2010). 
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direct contributions, on a dollar-per-dollar basis, this in no way implies they 
are worth nothing.  It simply would mean that it takes more dollars in 
independent expenditures to achieve the same effects—both in the 
campaign and presumably on the politician—as a given direct contribution. 
For independent expenditures to be worthless to the parties involved—
and therefore to represent something truly different from direct 
contributions—they not only would need to be inefficient, but also to entail 
something like a chance of backfiring and becoming a liability to the 
campaign.  This kind of risk could make independent expenditures a net 
loss to the campaign.111  But, if such risk governed the expectations, then 
candidates would prefer interest groups not to spend money on their behalf.  
Likewise, the donors would oblige as they have no incentive to sabotage 
their own preferred candidates.  If independent expenditures do, in fact, 
operate this way, then an array of sophisticated actors are making 
widespread, systematic, repeated, and expensive errors.112  There is simply 
no reason to believe this is the case.  Independent expenditures have the 
same sorts of effects as direct campaign contributions:  they both affect 
policymaking. 
In spite of the large sums expended in this implicit marketplace, the 
relationship between campaign financing and policy can be difficult to 
detect, as both donors and politicians have incentives to conceal this 
relationship.113  To the extent that campaign financing choices aim to get 
the elected official to make an unpopular policy choice—and if the policy 
were already popular then it would not require much to induce someone to 
enact it—then there is every expectation that the voters will punish the 
official for it.114  Voters also may punish elected officials who change their 
policies to suit their donors because they worry that their interests are being 
sacrificed to that end.  We should therefore expect subtle, hard-to-detect 
behavior, and it is not entirely surprising that some empirical studies have 
not documented a robust relationship between campaign contributions and 
lawmakers’ actions.115 
 
 111. Something like this seems to be what the Buckley Court had in mind, though it 
arrived at this conclusion without any specific support in the record. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 47 (1976). 
 112. The 2012 election cycle saw over $1 billion spent in independent expenditures; $550 
million was spent during the 2014 cycle. See Kevin Quealy & Derek Willis, Independent 
Spending Totals, N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-finance/ 
independent-expenditures/totals (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/RGU3-PB9A]; 
Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Party Committees, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/cycle_tots.php (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/94RM-AMFX]; Derek Willis, Outside Groups Set Spending Record in 
Midterms, N.Y. TIMES:  UPSHOT (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/11/ 
upshot/outside-groups-set-spending-record-in-midterms-.html [https://perma.cc/J4QW-
VNVC]. 
 113. See Gordon, Hafer & Landa, supra note 104, at 1058. 
 114. See Sanford C. Gordon & Catherine Hafer, Corporate Influence and the Regulatory 
Mandate, 69 J. POL. 300, 302 (2007); see also Gordon, Hafer & Landa, supra note 104, at 
1058 (citing Andrea Prat, Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational 
Voters, and Multiple Lobbies, 103 J. ECON. THEORY 162 (2002)). 
 115. Ansolabehere, de Figuerido & Snyder, Jr., supra note 104. 
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The subtle influence of campaign financing can take many forms.  
Richard Hall and Frank Wayman116 show that campaign contributions are 
able to mobilize support and diminish resistance in committees in relatively 
hidden ways.117  Campaign contributions also can work via the 
bureaucracy.  Legislators can be induced to make “status calls” to 
bureaucrats in order to affect how they enforce a law or rule.118  Or, as 
Sanford Gordon and Catherine Hafer describe, campaign contributions119 
can be used by a regulated corporation to “flex muscle” by signaling to 
bureaucrats that they have the resources and willingness to contest 
regulatory actions, thereby increasing the costs of those actions to the 
agency.120  In response to a corporation’s credible threat to impose these 
steep costs, the agency may prefer to scale back its enforcement against that 
corporation, perhaps focusing on targets unable or unwilling to fight back 
as aggressively, or even commit its scarce resources to other priorities.121  
Neither status calls nor flexing muscle implicate bureaucratic capture in the 
traditional sense;122 the industry or interest group in question need not exert 
any special influence over the agency. 
A version of flexing muscles also can be turned against elected officials 
themselves.  Substantial campaign expenditures—or other signals that the 
firm is capable of making such expenditures—serve as an implicit threat to 
elected officials; if incumbents do not behave favorably toward the firm or 
interest group, it will divert its political resources to their opponents.  The 
implicit threat strategy is especially subtle because it does not require any 
money to be spent in order to be successful.  Rather, it requires only that it 
be made clear that the money could and would be spent if the elected 
official fails to “play along.”  Standing at the ready is sufficient.  So, money 
 
 116. Hall & Wayman, supra note 103. 
 117. Id. at 810–13 (describing results in detail). 
 118. Brian Kelleher Richter, Krislert Samphantharak & Jeffrey F. Timmons, Lobbying 
and Taxes, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 893, 895 (2009). 
 119. Campaign contributions are not the only way a corporation can flex its muscles.  
Retaining lobbyists would be an alternative. Sanford C. Gordon & Catherine Hafer, Flexing 
Muscle:  Corporate Political Expenditures As Signals to the Bureaucracy, 99 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 245, 247–51 (2005).  Other forms of “burning money,” however, do not necessarily 
have the same effect as political expenditures. Id. at 256–57. 
 120. Id. at 246–47.  The signaling in the “flexing muscle” account contrasts with the 
earlier signaling accounts of lobbying that focused on special interests gaining access to the 
incumbents to signal to them some privately known aspect of the political or economic 
environment in which the incumbents may be expected to have a policy interest. See, e.g., 
David Austen-Smith & John R. Wright, Counteractive Lobbying, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 25 
(1994); David Austen-Smith, Information and Influence:  Lobbying for Agendas and Votes, 
37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 799 (1993). 
 121. The deterrence benefit of flexing muscles also is specific to the individual 
corporation, providing a means to mitigate collective action problems inherent in lobbying 
for favorable policy. Gordon & Hafer, supra note 119, at 300. 
 122. Bureaucratic capture generally refers to instances where a regulated industry or 
interest group can gain control of the agency that is supposed to regulate it and use it for the 
industry’s own ends rather than the public good.  The canonical cite is George J. Stigler, The 
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).  For a more recent 
overview of the phenomenon, see PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE:  SPECIAL INTEREST 
INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014). 
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can change the official’s policy choices without there actually being a 
transaction of any sort.  In fact, the only times we should see any campaign 
spending due to an implicit threat, i.e., the threat being executed, is when 
someone makes a mistake like underestimating the other party’s 
commitment. 
After Citizens United, the potential gravity of the threat of substantial 
independent expenditures, and thus their potential influence over 
policymaking, has been magnified.  Unrestricted independent expenditures 
offer an easy way for a firm to flex its muscles.  Similarly, an interest group 
now can threaten lavish spending on ads supporting the electoral opponents 
of candidates that adopt unfavorable positions, strategies adopted by the 
National Rifle Association and Michael Bloomberg’s Independence USA 
Super PAC.123  Such implicit threats are more effective with the unlimited 
independent expenditure regime put in place by Citizens United.  Limits on 
spending or contributions truncate the types of signals interest groups can 
send.  An interest group that is more committed than the spending limit 
would indicate has no easy way to convey that to candidates, making it 
harder to communicate its threat.  Unlimited expenditures allow for more 
determined interest groups to both signal that commitment—that is, to 
convey their threat and its seriousness—and to execute that threat more 
effectively.  The improved clarity of the interest group’s signal makes 
mistakes by either party less likely, so we are even less likely to witness an 
actual transaction arising from an implicit threat, making the strategy 
subtler.  Additionally, since this implicit threat strategy now is more likely 
to succeed, it is a more valuable strategy for interest groups to pursue, 
inducing more of them to adopt it.  The likely success of implicit threats 
begets more implicit threats. 
The studies and holdings cited in this section show that money can have a 
substantial effect on policymaking through a variety of mechanisms and not 
just the quid pro quo exchanges singled out in Citizens United.  There are 
good reasons to believe that independent expenditures are an effective tool 
for campaign donors to exert influence over policy—indeed, potentially 
more effective than direct contributions.124 
 
 123. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, Bloomberg Plans a $50 Million Challenge to the N.R.A., 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/us/bloomberg-plans-a-50-
million-challenge-to-the-nra.html [https://perma.cc/2LXM-2HYJ]. 
 124. We have focused the discussion in the preceding section on the direct influence of 
money on policymaking.  A complementary mechanism, which we abstract away from in 
this Article, runs through the selection effects of political competition.  A simple way of 
making this point is to note that asymmetric political expenditures, including independent 
expenditures, create asymmetric access to the voters, skewing political discourse and the 
distribution of voter preferences that results from it.  A recently proposed alternative to the 
signaling account of communication focuses on persuasion through argumentation. See 
generally Eric Dickson, Catherine Hafer & Dimitri Landa, Learning from Debate:  
Institutions and Information, 3 POL. SCI. RES. & METHODS 449 (2015); Catherine Hafer & 
Dimitri Landa, Deliberation As Self-Discovery and Institutions for Political Speech, 19 J. 
THEORETICAL POL. 329 (2007); Dimitri Landa, New Behavioral Political Economy, 
Argumentation, and Democratic Theory, 24 GOOD SOC’Y 86 (2015).  This proposed 
alternative to the signaling account points specifically to a variety of welfare effects 
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C.  Reading Citizens United’s Anticorruption Interest 
Citizens United appears to take an unnecessarily naïve view of the sorts 
of influence that donors can wield.  While the case focuses exclusively on 
quid pro quo exchanges, there are myriad ways in which moneyed interests 
can shape policy, and these are not confined to direct contributions.  We 
argue that the strongest reading of Citizens United is that its narrow 
definition of corruption and the anticorruption interest is compelled by the 
First Amendment.  In essence, the Court is explaining that the 
Constitution’s commitment to free speech only allows for limits on political 
spending, a form of speech, in those specific cases.  Responses to the 
broader issues raised by money in politics are constitutionally permissible, 
provided those responses do not infringe on speech. 
In other words, Citizens United’s use of “corruption” is very much a term 
of art.  In the context of campaign finance regulation, where free speech is 
at issue, the term does not mean the general idea of undue, biased, or 
disproportionate influence over an official.125  Instead, “corruption” 
designates the specific quid pro quo exchanges identified in Buckley and 
again in Citizens United and McCutcheon.  Put simply, we argue that when 
the Supreme Court’s majority and plurality opinions in these cases use the 
term “corruption,” they are best understood as saying “corruption as defined 
by Buckley.”  While the main dispute within the Court in these cases is the 
definition of this term,126 the application of that term (so defined) is 
confined to the context of campaign finance; it is not meant to extend to 
cases where speech is not directly an issue. 
This reading resolves the tension between Caperton and Citizens United.  
In distinguishing Caperton from Citizens United, the Supreme Court 
focused on the remedy sought by the litigant or lawmakers,127 stating 
 
stemming from the speakers’ asymmetric access to the audience. See Hafer & Landa, supra, 
at 347–50. 
 125. See Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 
CONST. COMMENT. 127 (1997). 
 126. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1466–68 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 447–48 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 422–24 (2000) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
 127. There are other potential ways to reconcile these cases, such as distinguishing judges 
from other elected officials because they are held to a high standard of impartiality. See 
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1667, 1672 (2015); infra notes 134–38 and 
accompanying text (discussing Williams-Yule).  So, what amounts to impermissible 
favoritism for a judge might be entirely appropriate for another elected official, who is 
supposed to be swayed by her constituents. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (quoting 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part)). 
While some decisions seem to endorse this logic—notably Republican Party of Minnesota 
v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 783–84 (2002), and Williams-Yulee—the Supreme Court did not 
adopt it in Citizens United.  Indeed, Justice Kennedy dissented in Williams-Yulee and wrote a 
critical concurrence in White. 536 U.S. at 794 (“Minnesota may choose to have an elected 
judiciary . . . .  It may adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process 
requires . . . .  What Minnesota may not do, however, is censor what the people hear as they 
undertake to decide for themselves which candidate is most likely to be an exemplary 
judicial officer.”). 
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simply that “Caperton’s holding was limited to the rule that the judge must 
be recused, not that the litigant’s political speech could be banned.”128  
While the First Amendment ties lawmakers’ and courts’ hands when it 
comes to regulating campaign expenditures, the possibility of regulatory 
responses that do not restrict speech remains open.  We describe two such 
possible responses in Parts III and IV below. 
Our approach here follows Justice Kennedy’s lead by looking to the 
difference in remedies and the different constitutional principles they 
implicate.  In Citizens United, concerns about undue influence over 
politicians motivated a law that restricted speech—the relevant provisions 
of BCRA.  However, the Court only recognized one concern that can justify 
such a restriction, which it distinguished from the less straightforward 
influence arising out of independent expenditures.129  By contrast, in 
Caperton, judicial recusal was a readily available and accepted remedy and 
one that does not infringe on the First Amendment.  Thus, a kind of 
worrying influence that did not constitute “corruption,” under the specific 
definition used by the Citizens United Court, still could be enough to 
prompt official action, just not action that restricts speech.  As Justice 
Kennedy explained in Citizens United: 
When Congress finds that a problem exists, we must give that finding due 
deference; but Congress may not choose an unconstitutional remedy.  If 
elected officials succumb to improper influences from independent 
expenditures; if they surrender their best judgment; and if they put 
expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for concern.130 
Such concerns could not authorize the rules BCRA put in place—an 
unconstitutional remedy because they banned some political speech and 
were not tailored to prevent quid pro quo exchanges131—but that does not 
prevent alternative forms of regulation. 
Our understanding of Citizens United is also more consistent with what 
we know about how politicians behave.  We characterize the Court’s 
definition of corruption as a matter of doctrine, a statement about what the 
First Amendment requires rather than about the nature of elected officials 
and the institutions they inhabit.  Hence, we do not take the Supreme Court 
to be concluding, apparently as a matter of law (recall that neither Citizens 
United nor McCutcheon developed factual records that undermined 
McConnell),132 that independent campaign expenditures cannot affect the 
decisions of elected officials.  Instead, we take this sort of statement to 
mean that those activities do not fall within the category of quid pro quo 
exchanges of policy for campaign support that justifies limiting campaign 
expenditures, i.e., limiting speech.  Other campaign finance activities can 
 
 128. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360. 
 129. But see McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1466–71 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Citizens United, 
558 U.S. at 447–52 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
 130. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See id. at 399–402 & 400 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1479–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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influence officials and policy, and this influence may amount to a serious 
problem, because it undermines democratic accountability and control.  
Some statements in the majority opinion of Citizens United do seem to 
endorse a broader reading of the case, indicating that independent 
expenditures do not, as a rule, sway elected officials.133  That is not part of 
Citizens United’s holding, though, and possibly not even an express 
conclusion by a majority of the Court.  It is, at most, dicta, and we read it as 
such. 
A more recent Supreme Court decision on judicial politics, Williams-
Yulee v. Florida Bar,134 does not controvert our reading of the doctrine.  
Williams-Yulee considered a First Amendment challenge to a common state 
rule135 that barred candidates for judicial office from personally asking for 
campaign funds, requiring them to raise money through campaign 
committees instead.136  A closely divided Court struck down this restriction 
on campaign fundraising.  In doing so, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the 
Court, cited a government interest “in preserving public confidence in the 
integrity of its judiciary” that “extends beyond its interest in preventing the 
appearance of corruption in legislative and executive elections.”137  
According to Williams-Yulee, judges are different from other elected 
officials.  Elected officials are generally supposed to be responsive to their 
supporters and their interests, including and perhaps especially those who 
demonstrate the depth of their support through campaign spending.  Judges, 
on the other hand, are supposed to be impartial and “not [] follow the 
preferences of [their] supporters, or provide any special consideration to 
[their] campaign donors.”138 
While both cases deal with judicial elections, there are important 
distinctions between Caperton and Williams-Yulee.  The Williams-Yulee 
ruling clearly exists on the contributions side of the 
contributions/expenditures divide that has been so crucial to campaign 
finance law.  Caperton dealt almost exclusively with independent 
expenditures.139  Chief Justice Roberts made it a point to emphasize the 
limited scope of the Williams-Yulee ruling.140  An expansive understanding 
of Williams-Yulee, and a willingness to extend its logic to even slightly 
different contexts, could amount to a major change in the post-Citizens 
United campaign finance law; if judges are somehow special, which gives 
rise to alternative compelling government interests that are more capacious 
 
 133. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360 (“[T]here is only scant evidence that 
independent expenditures even ingratiate.” (citing McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d. 176, 
555–57 (D.D.C. 2003) (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.))). But see supra notes 93–98 
(discussing McConnell). 
 134. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
 135. Id. at 1663. 
 136. Id. at 1662–63. 
 137. Id. at 1667. 
 138. Id.; cf. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. 
at 1681–82 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1683–84 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 139. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 140. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1672; see also id. at 1679–80 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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than the anticorruption interest as it is currently interpreted, then that raises 
the possibility that there might be analogous specialized government 
interests that would apply to other elected officials, potentially authorizing a 
wider variety of direct campaign finance regulation.  This would be a retreat 
from Citizens United’s decisively negative treatment of alternative 
compelling government interests.141 
Such an expansive understanding of Williams-Yulee could represent the 
road not taken in Caperton, perhaps because Justice Kennedy consistently 
has been critical of this line of reasoning.142  It is, however, orthogonal to 
our insights based on Caperton.  We draw two main conclusions from that 
case.  First, Caperton illustrates that the restrictions placed on campaign 
finance regulation by the First Amendment only apply when speech is 
directly restricted.  Second, Caperton indicates that independent 
expenditures can, in and of themselves, be sufficient to justify official 
government responses, provided that response does not directly infringe on 
speech.  At most, a doctrine that uses Williams-Yulee as a jumping-off point 
and, crucially, extends it to cases involving independent expenditures, 
would allow for an alternative, though not mutually exclusive, way to 
address a situation along the lines of the facts in Caperton. 
What hinges on our particular reading of the jurisprudence is the 
possibility of other ways of managing the disproportionate (and sometimes 
troubling) influence that grows out of money in politics.  Properly 
understood, Citizens United does not foreclose those alternatives, and the 
following parts describe two ways of regulating money’s troubling effects 
on politics that are permitted by the doctrine. 
III.  AN AVAILABLE JUDICIAL RESPONSE 
TO CAMPAIGN FINANCING 
This part is devoted to one means of ameliorating the distortionary 
effects of campaign expenditures on policy that is not restricted by Citizens 
United:  courts could play a more assertive role at the end of the 
policymaking process.  Existing doctrine empowers courts to engage in a 
relatively demanding form of rational basis review when the interests of 
some individual or entity that has made substantial contributions to—or 
made substantial independent expenditures on behalf of143—the relevant 
officials in their last campaigns are implicated.  Roughly, we propose 
something along the lines of Caperton, substituting tighter judicial scrutiny 
of the policy enacted in place of recusal.  This scrutiny would not infringe 
on any speech rights and consequently would not need to be limited 
 
 141. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 142. See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1682–83. 
 143. As throughout, we use terms like “campaign contribution” and “donation” broadly to 
encompass direct contributions to candidates, their campaigns, or PACs, and also 
independent campaign expenditures that favor a given candidate or hamper her opponent.  
So, a corporation that has spent a million dollars on ads railing against Senator Smith should 
be understood in this context to have effectively contributed a million dollars to Senator 
Smith’s opponent. 
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exclusively to cases of quid pro quo exchanges.  In turn, this judicial 
response is free to address a wider variety of campaign activities than ex 
ante campaign finance regulation can, including independent expenditures.  
Additionally, it has the virtues of both building closely on existing doctrines 
and being readily implementable by courts. 
A.  What Is Modified Rational Basis Review? 
Rational basis review is part of the substantive due process and equal 
protection doctrines based on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
although it is applied in other contexts as well.144  Substantive due 
process145 extends constitutional protection to rights not explicitly listed in 
the Bill of Rights,146 including the right to privacy147 and a right to 
association distinct from that safeguarded by the First Amendment.148  As 
Justice Harlan explained: 
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause 
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific 
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution.  This “liberty” is not a 
series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the 
freedom of speech, press, and religion . . . and so on.  It is a rational 
continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all 
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints . . . .149 
This proposition also is supported by the Ninth Amendment150 and has been 
invoked by courts repeatedly.151 
Due process thus contains a prohibition against arbitrary or purposeless 
infringements on liberty.  Most laws and policies do not infringe on a 
 
 144. See e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1689, 1710–12 (1984).  Sunstein argues that there is overlap in the principles behind 
the Dormant Commerce, Privileges and Immunities, Equal Protection, Due Process, 
Contract, and Eminent Domain Clauses. Id. 
 145. The distinction between substantive due process and procedural due process is 
analytically useful, but it should not be overread.  At bottom, the two ideas are the same, 
especially since they share a core, namely that the Constitution protects people from the 
arbitrary exercise of government power: 
We have emphasized time and again that “[t]he touchstone of due process is 
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government, whether the 
fault lies in a denial of fundamental procedural fairness, or in the exercise of power 
without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate government 
objective.” 
City of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998) (alterations in original) (citations 
omitted). 
 146. See, e.g., Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 147. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973). 
 148. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 616–18 (1984). 
 149. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on 
procedural grounds); see also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). 
 150. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487–93 (1965) (Goldberg, J, concurring); 
Mark A. Racanelli, Reversals:  Privacy and the Rehnquist Court, 81 GEO. L.J. 443, 447–49 
(1992). 
 151. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) 
(collecting cases); Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (collecting cases). 
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fundamental right, even one not enumerated in the Constitution.  Therefore, 
in most cases, all that due process requires is that the law has some means–
end relationship with a government interest:  “[T]he guaranty of due 
process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be 
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have 
a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.”152  So, the 
general liberty protections contained in due process apply broadly, but are 
not demanding. 
The scope of legitimate government interests that can serve as a rational 
basis is wide ranging, seemingly reaching the limits of the government’s 
police power,153 and the government is given considerable leeway in how it 
goes about achieving this purpose.154  In contrast to cases where a more 
demanding standard—like strict scrutiny—is applied, under the rational 
basis standard, the policy may be underinclusive155 or overinclusive156 with 
regard to its purpose.  Perhaps most importantly, the policy satisfies the 
rational basis standard if it bears a rational relationship to any conceivable 
government interest, even one that is offered post hoc,157 and courts 
presume that the facts favorable to this explanation existed at the time the 
law was enacted.158  All told, then, the rational basis standard is extremely 
deferential.159  It is so deferential that it rarely will have an effect; a rational 
relationship to a legitimate government purpose, and one that can be offered 
post hoc, is easily identified.  While the constitutional requirements of 
 
 152. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 510–11. 
 153. Id. at 537 (“So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence 
of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may 
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation 
adapted to its purpose.”); Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). 
 154. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980) (citing Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 
78); accord City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“States are accorded 
wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and 
rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”). 
 155. Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949). 
 156. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970). 
 157. See, e.g., Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179 (identifying maintaining a retirement system as a 
legitimate state interest, and noting that only “plausible reasons” for Congress’s actions are 
required); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 492–97 (1974); Williamson v. Lee Optical of 
Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 490 (1955) (citing a number of conclusions the legislature might 
have arrived at to justify the legislation); Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 336 U.S. at 109–10 (“We 
would be trespassing on one of the most intensely local and specialized of all municipal 
problems if we held that this regulation had no relation to the traffic problem of New York 
City.  It is the judgment of the local authorities that it does have such a relation.  And 
nothing has been advanced which shows that to be palpably false . . . .  The local authorities 
may well have concluded that those who advertise their own wares on their trucks do not 
present the same traffic problem in view of the nature or extent of the advertising which they 
use.  It would take a degree of omniscience which we lack to say that such is not the case.”). 
 158. Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 78–79; accord United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 
144, 153–54 (1938). 
 159. See, e.g., Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002); KATHLEEN M. 
SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 601 (18th ed. 2013); Sunstein, supra 
note 144, at 1697. 
2016] BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED 2783 
substantive due process exist, they have little bite.160  Usually, these 
requirements only matter when a court identifies an important right, such as 
privacy, that the policy invades because in those cases, a substantially 
stricter standard than rational review applies.161 
When campaign spending makes a policy look democratically suspect 
(which we will define in more detail below), courts should modify the 
rational basis test in one key respect:  the review should not be as 
deferential.  The object of the inquiry remains the same:  Is the policy 
rationally related to some government purpose, i.e., is it a means by which 
that end, at least to some extent, can be realized?  But in these special cases, 
the statute would not come to the courts “bearing a strong presumption of 
validity,”162 and those challenging it would not “have the burden ‘to 
negative every conceivable basis which might support it.’”163  Instead, the 
burden of proof would be allocated more evenly.  Modified rational basis 
review does not operate like strict scrutiny, so the law should not have to be 
the best means of achieving its goals.  That is, the fit between the law and 
its purported purpose need not be perfect; it can be both under- and 
overinclusive, just not grossly so.  At a certain point, if the policy is a truly 
bad fit for its ostensible purpose, then that purpose looks irrelevant or like a 
pretext.  In short, modified rational basis review is rational basis review, but 
the playing field is more level. 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.,164 a touchstone for the 
modern treatment of rational basis review of economic legislation,165 helps 
illustrate modified rational basis review in practice.  At issue in Lee Optical 
was an Oklahoma law that placed a number of restrictions on opticians and 
glasses retailers.166  Among other things, the statute barred anyone other 
than a “licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist” from fitting or adjusting 
glasses frames, and it forbade eyeglass sellers from advertising.167  The trial 
court determined that these restrictions were not rationally related to the 
law’s goal of providing the people of Oklahoma with the best possible 
vision care and, more generally, public health and welfare.168  In 
overturning this decision, the Supreme Court held that all that was required 
 
 160. This can be contrasted to so-called “rational basis review with bite,” where a court 
seems to be applying a stricter standard while purporting to engage in rational basis review.  
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 455, 465–70 (1985) (Marshall, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 
(2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 161. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also id. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
 162. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (citations omitted). 
 163. Id. at 315 (citations omitted) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 
410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)). 
 164. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 165. Randy E. Barnett, Keynote Remarks:  Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of Lee 
Optical, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 845, 856 (2012). 
 166. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 485–86. 
 167. Id. at 485, 489–90. 
 168. Lee Optical of Okla. v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128, 133–34, 140–41 (W.D. Okla. 
1954), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 348 U.S. at 483. 
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is some conceivable, hypothetical reason why the legislature enacted the 
policy and then listed some possible candidates using the extremely 
deferential standard described above.  Modified rational basis review 
removes this strong presumption of constitutionality, so the law must be 
shown to actually serve some public purpose, basically the standard used by 
the lower court in this case.  Thus, the government would have to 
demonstrate how forbidding anyone other than a licensed optometrist or 
ophthalmologist from adjusting glasses promoted eye health, at least to 
some degree.  If a law like this Oklahoma statute were to be subjected to 
modified rational basis review (requiring that the threshold inquiry 
discussed in more detail below was satisfied), then, following the lower 
court’s analysis, it likely would be struck down.  Under the laxer standard 
of ordinary rational basis review, however, it was upheld.169 
The following scenario, inspired by the facts of Nebbia v. New York170 
and Carolene Products, provides another, closer example of modified 
rational basis review.  Suppose the state of New York banned a milk 
substitute constituted from vegetables.  Suppose further that the state 
legislature is organized into committees that are influential171 and that the 
members of the relevant committee received extensive campaign support 
from those with an interest in this policy—such as the local dairy industry.  
As a first step in this litigation, the plaintiff172 would have to prove that the 
relevant legislators did, in fact, receive this campaign support; that the 
contributors’ interests are implicated by this law; and that the contributions 
were substantial enough to warrant the reasonable inference that the 
legislators might be beholden to these interested parties. 
These elements make up what can be thought of as the plaintiffs’ prima 
facie case for modified rational basis review.173  Then, proponents of the 
law have to identify its rational basis.  Carolene Products applied rational 
basis review to a federal statute very similar to this milk substitute 
hypothetical.  In the course of doing so, the Court cited evidence from 
congressional hearings and other sources that the banned products were a 
danger to public health because they lacked nutrients, and consumers 
tended to substitute the cheaper, though less nutritional, substitutes for 
actual milk products.174  Preventing this from happening was held to be a 
 
 169. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 491. 
 170. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
 171. One way that committees often exert considerable influence over lawmaking is 
through agenda-setting power.  The classic model of agenda-setting power is contained in 
Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, 
and the Status Quo, 33 PUB. CHOICE, no. 4, 1978, at 27. 
 172. As in all civil litigation, the plaintiff would also have to establish standing.  This 
would not be difficult here if the plaintiff was, for example, a shop owner who wanted to 
stock the forbidden product.  This was the case in both Nebbia and Carolene Products, 
where the ones challenging the laws’ constitutionality were sellers who allegedly had 
violated them and were therefore subject to punishment. 
 173. Since the law in this scenario and in Lee Optical imposed some restraint, barring 
people from a commercial activity they were previously free to pursue, it was already subject 
to ordinary rational basis review. 
 174. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 148–50, 149 n.2, 150 n.3 (1938). 
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legitimate public purpose, as it is connected to public health and welfare, 
and banning these products was a means rationally related to that end, so 
the law was upheld.  That sort of evidence also would satisfy modified 
rational basis review.  This example also highlights that modified rational 
basis review does not require that the particular law be the best means to an 
end.  There may be substantial trade offs:  it might be the case that the milk 
substitute, because it was cheaper, was valuable to poorer consumers 
because it gave them some access to dairy products—substitute milk might 
have been better than no milk at all.  But, the rational basis review standard, 
even in modified form, does not necessitate that the challenged policy is the 
best or most efficient means to achieving its end. 
B.  The Threshold Question:  When Should Courts Engage 
in Modified Rational Basis Review? 
We now return to the question of when courts should engage in modified 
rational basis review.  Under what circumstances is this review warranted?  
This is a complicated question.  The problem lies in defining a baseline 
against which we can verify what counts as “disproportionate” or “undue” 
influence that campaign money is buying.175  Put another way, how do we 
distinguish between an instance of subversion of the political process and 
that process working as intended?  Absent a compelling answer to this 
question, we run the risk of punishing affected parties just because they are 
good at organizing, passionately committed to their cause, or popular.176  
Further, this baseline must be constructed carefully as the definition of 
disproportionate influence runs the risk of amounting to policies or interest 
groups disfavored by the jurist or commentator.177  We should not smuggle 
in assessments of the policies that an interest group advocates when 
considering whether the political process has been undermined in the course 
of a campaign.  This is a challenge whenever the judiciary attempts to curb 
undue influence in the political process.178 
 
 175. We are, of course, not the first to make this observation. See, e.g., Einer R. Elhauge, 
Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 
(1991).  Justice Scalia has made a similar point in oral arguments. Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 8, Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (Nos. 90-757, 90-1032) (question 
from Justice Scalia). 
 176. The balance to be struck here is similar to the one required in antitrust, where a firm 
should not be punished simply because it is successful.  For Learned Hand’s canonical 
statement of this principle, see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 
(2d Cir. 1945) (“The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be 
turned upon when he wins.”). See also Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407–08 (2004); United States v. Grinnell, Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 
570–71 (1966). 
 177. Elhauge, supra note 175, at 48–49. 
 178. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword:  The 
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Politics Without Romance:  Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory 
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding 
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:  An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
223 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation:  Notes Toward a Public, Public 
Law, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849 (1980); Sunstein, supra note 144. 
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We take Caperton as a blueprint for this threshold inquiry.  In Caperton, 
the Supreme Court identified a number of factors indicating that an elected 
official was beholden to, or would be perceived as being beholden to, a 
campaign contributor,179 raising concerns that their decisions might cater to 
the contributor’s wishes at the expense of their constituency’s interests or 
their personal judgments about the best course of action.180  The key factor 
is the size of the campaign contributions relative to the amount of spending 
in the campaign, which serves as critical evidence as to whether the 
contributions were likely to have a tangible impact on the election and, 
through that, on the official’s behavior.181  Other factors include the timing 
of the contributions, the stake the contributor has in the policy at hand, and 
any other evidence that would indicate that the contributions had a 
substantial effect on the outcome of the election.182  Following Caperton, 
modified rational basis review would be triggered when the contributions 
were relatively large, the election was close, and the issue was raised soon 
after the election or perhaps immediately preceding a new one.  As 
emphasized by Caperton, these factors are all objective:  there is no inquiry 
into whether the policymaker was actually swayed by the campaign 
contributions.183  This approach also makes sense for our proposal, as 
guarding against the appearance that the democratic process has been 
subverted by campaign financing consistently has been considered an 
important goal in and of itself. 
As a practical matter, this analysis is complicated by the fact that many 
policies are enacted by multimember bodies.  The decision leading to 
Caperton was made by a panel (and the judge who ultimately had to recuse 
himself was the decisive vote).184  In order to trigger the review we describe 
in this section, litigants should be obliged to show that a pivotal or 
influential policymaker was affected.  In a 75-25 vote on a policy, showing 
that a single legislator was potentially influenced by campaign contributions 
does not, on its own, indicate that the ultimate policy choice was affected.  
Committee chairs, drafters of bills, and officials who can serve as 
gatekeepers also would be important to consider as they can all 
substantially affect the policies enacted. 
Also, this threshold inquiry would be aided by clear, transparent, and 
easily enforceable disclosure rules relating to campaign financing, including 
independent expenditures.  Eight justices wrote in favor of a disclosure 
regime in Citizens United, explaining that disclosure requirements impose 
very little on speech, highlighting the benefits of disclosing who was 
speaking in support of a candidate and citing a governmental interest in 
 
 179. We use the term contributor in this discussion for ease of reference.  The campaign 
support at issue in Caperton was almost entirely through independent expenditures. See 
supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
 180. See supra notes 76–85 and accompanying text. 
 181. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 885. 
 184. Id. at 874–75. 
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providing the electorate with information about the sources of campaign 
spending.185 
Returning to our ban on milk substitutes example, we stated that the New 
York legislature had powerful committees.  Suppose a majority of the 
members sitting on the relevant committee had received campaign support 
in the form of independent expenditures from the dairy industry.  The dairy 
industry’s interests are obviously implicated by this law, so the question 
before the court would be whether that support was enough to make those 
legislators sufficiently beholden to the industry.  Following Caperton, the 
court would look at the magnitude of the expenditures, how close the 
election was, and so on.  If the dairy industry’s expenditures were relatively 
small and officials won their elections by landslides, indicating that they did 
not really need the industry’s support anyway, and are thus unlikely to feel 
beholden to it, then the threshold has not been met and the modified rational 
basis review ends here.  In contrast to the above hypothetical, in Caperton, 
Blankenship’s expenditures dwarfed everyone else’s, and the election was 
fairly close.  In circumstances similar to those in Caperton, the court would 
proceed to the modified rational basis review outlined above. 
It is worth noting that Caperton was also a due process case,186 and this 
Article suggests importing that case’s analysis of the facts into a slightly 
different context.  Caperton provides a method for determining when an 
elected official is considered biased in favor of, or unduly beholden to, a 
campaign contributor.187  In that case, after finding that the elected judge 
was so beholden, the Supreme Court ruled that due process required the 
judge’s recusal.  We propose to make use of the first part of Caperton, the 
grounds for finding bias or its appearance, in a broader context of elected 
officials generally.  Our suggestion also is consistent with Citizens United’s 
treatment of Caperton:  the majority opinion in Citizens United did not hold 
that under facts similar to Caperton, an elected official would not be 
influenced by the campaign expenditures.  Instead, the Court explained that 
such a finding could not justify restricting independent campaign 
expenditures.  It was the proposed remedy that was the problem, not 
inferences about the official’s behavior or motivations. 
Before turning to institutional design, two further features of this judicial 
response to campaign financing are worth highlighting.  First, modified 
rational basis review not only builds on existing doctrines, it is also 
practically achievable.  In practice, modified rational basis review bears a 
more than passing resemblance to hard look review,188 where courts 
 
 185. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–71 (2010). 
 186. In Caperton, the Supreme Court did not clearly distinguish substantive due process 
from procedural due process.  Although this distinction is, in some sense, unnecessary. See 
supra note 145. 
 187. See also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 458 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 188. For explanations of hard look review and the standard it uses, see Motor Vehicle 
Manufactures Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). See also 
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN L. REV. 363, 
2788 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
examine an agency’s policy choice to determine whether it was “arbitrary, 
capricious,” or “an abuse of discretion.”189  Modified rational basis review 
works along the same lines, with a legitimate state interest standing in as an 
analogue to the statutory directives and boundaries to which an agency is 
subject.  In a sense, this similarity is unsurprising.  Hard look review’s 
purpose is to respond to worries arising from the concentration of power in 
the hands of unelected bureaucrats.190  In the cases where modified rational 
basis review is warranted, there is evidence that elected officials are 
likewise not being held accountable to voters.  So, despite being formally 
elected, those officials are in a position similar to that of bureaucrats.  Both 
rational basis review and hard look review are familiar judicial practices, so 
modified rational basis review will not be difficult for courts to implement. 
Second, modified rational basis review has the potential for a wide-
ranging, subtle effect beyond striking down specific policies.  As detailed 
above, those spending money in campaigns are doing so for a reason:  they 
seek favorable policies.191  If campaign donors know that the policies they 
are trying to “buy” have a higher likelihood of being struck down, that 
reduces the value of those policies to the potential donors.  If Blankenship 
had known that Benjamin would have to recuse himself from the case, that 
may have affected his decision to commit funds to the West Virginia 
judicial race.  In this way, modified rational basis review has the potential 
to inject some discipline into the effective “market” for campaign 
financing.192 
 
387–88 (1986); Peter L. Strauss, Considering Political Alternatives to “Hard Look” Review, 
1989 DUKE L.J. 538, 539. 
 189. The hard look doctrine originally consisted of making sure the agency itself had 
taken a “hard look” at the issue and given its rigorous consideration. See, e.g., Greater Bos. 
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 
(1971); Harold Levanthal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 
U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 
1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177, 181.  Later, the doctrine evolved whereby the courts themselves 
taking the hard look. 
The distinction between these two hard looks may be a bit artificial, though.  How else 
would an agency demonstrate that it had been thorough in its investigation other than by 
creating a record that shows what evidence and considerations led to its decision?  Once the 
agency is presenting such a record to a court, and explaining how the evidence supports its 
position, it is engaged in a process very similar to the current hard look review practice.  It 
will be arguing to the court that its choice was a good (or reasonable, etc.) one on the basis 
of this evidence. 
 190. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 189, at 198–99. 
 191. See supra Part II.B. 
 192. In an influential article, Issacharoff and Karlan argue that campaign finance 
regulation simply squeezes campaign funds into the (relatively) unregulated venue. Samuel 
Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. 
REV. 1705 (1999).  Unlike the campaign finance regulations Issacharoff and Karlan consider, 
however, the market effect of modified rational basis review does not try to block campaign 
spending, which would simply encourage sophisticated parties to look for ways around the 
restrictions. Id. at 1722.  It instead affects the incentives, and therefore the willingness, of 
potential donors to spend money on campaigns in the first place.  The “hydraulic” property 
that Issacharoff and Karlan identify, thus, does not clearly apply to our different approach. 
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IV.  AGENCY INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
Elements of institutional structure—who reports to whom, who has the 
final say over the budget, what enforcement powers are available to various 
political principals—determines who exercises influence over the 
institution, potentially empowering one set of interests and disempowering 
others.  Procedural requirements, such as the burden of proof necessary for 
official action,193 impact statements requiring policymakers to take into 
account a specific interest and alert that interest to policies it might care 
about,194 and many others often have asymmetric effects as well, favoring 
some interests rather than others.195  Institutional features can be selected to 
limit the potential for undue influence of money over policy, thereby 
reducing the capacity for moneyed interest groups to promote the policies 
they, rather than the voters, prefer.  In this part, we describe two principles 
of institutional design that can advance this goal:  delegating policymaking 
responsibility to elected officials with a broader constituency and delegating 
policymaking to insulated agencies.  Applied to different policy areas, these 
institutional solutions can help diminish the effects of money on policy 
outcomes. 
By controlling who an agency is most responsive to, institutional design 
closely parallels campaign finance regulation.  Consider, as a hypothetical, 
the consequences of a strict limit on both campaign contributions and 
independent expenditures—a scheme that would, of course, be 
unconstitutional.  Such a limit would lead politicians to cultivate 
relationships with diffuse, populous interest groups, dampening the 
influence of better-funded but smaller ones.  In effect, the campaign 
financing rule would prevent those latter type of groups from bringing their 
greater resources (or their greater willingness to use what resources they 
have) to bear.  Institutional design can bring about similar consequences, 
effectively substituting for the campaign finance regulation.  Roughly 
speaking, by influencing the definition of the effective “constituency,” both 
institutional design and campaign finance regulation affect the mapping 
from interest group characteristics (size, resources, organization, etc.) to 
influence over policy.  This general intuition is applicable to a broad range 
of policy areas and contexts and is at the core of our institutional approach 
to campaign finance regulation. 
 
 193. Jeffrey S. Hill & James E. Brazier, Constraining Administrative Decisions:  A 
Critical Examination of the Structure and Process Hypothesis, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 373, 386 
(1991) (citing the Motor Carrier Act of 1980). 
 194. There are impact statement rules requiring agencies to assess the effects of the 
proposed regulation on, inter alia, the environment, small businesses, families, foreign trade, 
and federalism. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on ‘Deossifying’ the Rulemaking 
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1400–07 (1992). 
 195. Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise:  Congressional Choices About 
Administrative Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62, 63 (1995); Hill & Brazier, supra note 
193, at 385–87; Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative 
Procedures As Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON & ORG. 243 (1987). 
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In the modern American government, executive agencies are responsible 
for a considerable share of policymaking.196  In addition to the parties and 
interest groups they interact with directly, agencies must also be concerned 
about their political principals, which possess an array of mechanisms to 
control agencies.197  Interest groups can and do pressure agencies indirectly 
through those officials; influence over the right politicians translates into 
influence over the agency.198  The decision to delegate an issue to an 
executive agency alters its effective constituency and can reduce the 
influence of campaign financing and other forms of political spending over 
it by changing the relevant set of political principals.  Specifically, 
delegating to an executive agency moves the issue from Congress’s direct 
control to the Executive, which diminishes the sway that a particular group 
of legislators have over it. 
By serving as both experts and gatekeepers,199 the members of the 
relevant congressional committees exercise considerable power over what 
Congress does.  In practice, the political principals most important to the 
agency are frequently not Congress as a whole, but a handful of key 
members.  Furthermore, committee memberships are not assigned 
randomly; they will be most valuable to legislators that have a distinct stake 
in the issue—a member of the House representing Detroit will have a keen 
interest in policies affecting the automotive industry—so legislators with 
distinct biases will self-select into the relevant committees.200  Direct 
congressional control over an issue often amounts to control by a limited 
number of legislators with relatively small constituencies and who are tied 
to specific interests. 
The President, on the other hand, has a broad, nationwide constituency, 
which makes it more difficult for a single interest group to control policy.  
 
 196. DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY:  REPUTATIONS, 
NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928, at 5 (2001).  As 
Cornelius Kerwin, Scott Furlong, and William West note, 
Virtually no statute of significance can be implemented as written by the agency 
receiving its authority . . . .  Congress produces statutes that are incomplete and/or 
imprecise. . . .  [T]hey [then] delegate to agencies the immense task of turning the 
general goals and objectives contained in legislation that provide the true 
architecture of contemporary public programs . . . .  The collective impact of rules 
constitutes nothing less than the operational definition of public policy. 
Cornelius Kerwin, Scott Furlong & William West, Interest Groups, Rulemaking and 
American Bureaucracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 601 
(Robert F. Durant ed., 2012). 
 197. Nicholas Almendares, Blame-Shifting, Judicial Review, and Public Welfare, 27 J.L. 
& POL. 239, 267–72 (2012). 
 198. McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 195; Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, 
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control:  Regulatory Policymaking by the 
Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983). 
 199. Bryan D. Jones, Frank R. Baumgartner & Jeffrey C. Talbert, The Destruction of 
Issue Monopolies in Congress, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 657, 658–59 (1993). 
 200. Kathleen Bawn, Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy:  Statutory 
Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101, 102–03, 102 
n.1 (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of the State:  A Public 
Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1341–43 (1994); Weingast & Moran, supra 
note 197, at 788–92. 
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Such a constituency is likely to encompass a variety of competing interest 
groups, and when the relevant issue is one of importance for a large group 
of voters—potentially important enough to determine how they cast their 
votes in the next election—the policy that a candidate with that 
constituency will endorse naturally is constrained to follow the interests of a 
large set of voters.  Thus, the interest groups must vie for broad support 
among the voters, either by moderating their policy demands or by 
attempting to persuade voters that the policy they favor is, in fact, the best 
one.  In this way, delegation to an executive agency trades the discretion of 
a small set of particular legislators, each of whom has a substantial 
likelihood of being biased toward an interest group, for that of the 
Executive who has to balance disparate interests to form a platform 
acceptable to a broad cross section of voters.  To put it differently, a broader 
and more diverse constituency implies greater prominence for policies with 
more universalistic appeal and lower likelihood of policy capture by narrow 
interests.  This formulation harkens back to James Madison’s key argument 
in The Federalist Papers in favor of a large republic;201 although that 
argument has received little or no systematic attention in the very extensive 
recent literature on institutional design of policymaking, it expresses a 
powerful idea that is particularly relevant to the post-Citizens United world. 
Similar, sometimes reinforcing, effects can come from adjusting the 
agency’s scope.  An agency tied to a single industry will develop a stake in 
that industry’s welfare.  The agency’s funding, prestige, and very existence 
would be tied to the industry’s.202  Making the agency responsible for a 
number of different industries—especially if they compete—counteracts 
these tendencies, leading to results analogous to those of a diverse 
constituency. 
Implementing the Madisonian strategy with these aspects of institutional 
design helps prevent situations like Caperton, where a campaign 
contributor’s interests displace those of the majority of voters.  Were an 
organized interest group to emerge, the Madisonian strategy helps ensure 
that any policy that ends up being responsive, if policy is responsive to the 
interest’s demands, also enjoys widespread support from the voters. 
The second major application of institutional design we focus on here 
involves insulating agencies from political control.  The typical means of 
doing so is to make the agency “independent” by restricting the President’s 
power to remove the agency’s leadership without a specified and delimited 
cause, typically “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”203  
 
 201. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 202. See Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of 
Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 96 (1992). 
 203. Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (And 
Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 787 (2013) (quoting Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 
104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383).  These terms remain somewhat ambiguous, as their precise 
meanings have not been ruled on. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and 
the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 110 (1994).  There also is some variation in the 
statutes protecting agency heads from at-will removal. Datla & Revesz, supra, at 787–88. 
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Properly understood, though, removal protections are but one, if a central, 
element of a bundle of institutional features that jointly amount to agency 
independence.  In that sense, independence also is a matter of degree—
agencies are more or less independent depending on which and how many 
of those institutional features they have.  A more general understanding of 
agency independence is important for our purposes as we mean to focus on 
institutional features that insulate agencies from interference in policy 
choices from both the executive branch and the legislature.204 
Among the features of agency independence are multimember boards, 
which, when combined with removal protection and staggered terms, make 
an agency more independent because an administration will only be able to 
replace the agency’s leadership gradually.  Independent litigation authority, 
so that the agency can sue without relying on the Department of Justice, 
increases its autonomy from the Executive.205  Supplying an agency with a 
separate source of revenue is another important way of fostering its 
independence;206 if the agency’s budget requests must go through the 
Office of Management and Budget, then that hands the President another 
means to influence that agency, and if Congress funds the agency at its 
discretion, then it can control its activities.207  Staffing also has an effect:  
political appointees offer presidents a way to steer agencies.208  Decreasing 
the number of such appointees, and their role within the agency, 
correspondingly increases its independence. 
It is important to note that the strategy of insulation that could be 
implemented with these institutional features and the Madisonian strategy 
of broadening the constituency, which we took up first,209 are attractive 
under different circumstances.  When the policy area is such that relatively 
few voters would make it a determining factor of their votes, or where some 
interests are naturally and systematically advantaged in organizing 
themselves politically, then the electoral constraint on which the 
effectiveness of the Madisonian strategy relies may simply not bind those 
seeking executive office.  It is precisely in those cases, however, that 
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insulation is attractive as a defense against special interests dominating the 
policymaking process. 
Delegating an issue to a very insulated agency has consequences along 
the lines of strict public financing of campaigns, although confined just to 
the issues that have been delegated.  While strict public financing of 
campaigns—including the elimination of independent expenditures in favor 
of, or in opposition to, candidates—would not completely prevent interest 
groups from deploying their resources to further their preferred political 
outcomes,210 it certainly would curtail their influence.  Of course, a public 
financing regime of this sort would be unconstitutional on a number of 
counts.211  Not only would it have to entail a ban on independent 
expenditures, an option that Citizens United forecloses,212 but the Supreme 
Court has held that contribution limits that are set too low also violate the 
Constitution, and strict public funding sets this limit at $0.213 
But, agency institutional design choices face little in the way of 
constitutional barriers.214  There presently exist numerous independent 
agencies, each with several of these institutional features.215  The Federal 
Trade Commission and National Labor Relations Board both have removal 
protection, multimember leadership boards, and some degree of 
independent litigation authority.216  Despite criticisms that independent 
agencies exacerbate the bureaucracy’s status as a “headless fourth branch of 
government” and do not fit within the separation of powers framework,217 
independent agencies have been consistently upheld by the Supreme 
Court.218  Courts have been willing not only to uphold agency 
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independence, but also to read in removal protections where none were 
explicitly stated.219  Delegation to executive agencies, the key element in 
the constituency-changing strategy described above, is even more 
straightforward.  Courts have permitted myriad delegations of authority to 
agencies, including delegation of policymaking authority with few 
constraints,220 stating, inter alia, that “we have ‘almost never felt qualified 
to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy 
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.’”221 
As a general matter, then, lawmakers enjoy a much freer hand when it 
comes to designing agencies as compared to enacting campaign finance 
regulation.  There do exist some constitutional constraints on agency 
institutional design, mostly arising from the separation of powers and 
procedural due process.  The overarching separation of powers principle is 
that while the agencies, as entities created by statute, are empowered by 
Congress, the legislature cannot have a hand in how they conduct their 
business.  That would violate the division of labor between the legislature 
and the Executive.  Therefore, Congress cannot actively supervise the 
agency,222 nor can it appoint the agency’s officers223 or create special 
procedures to remove them except for impeachment.224  While Congress 
can delegate powers to parts of itself—to congressional committees, for 
example—and authorize investigations and other tasks as part of its 
legislative function, these delegations cannot expand Congress’s authority.  
It cannot engage in tasks entrusted to the executive branch, such as 
enforcement powers.225  Other administrative activities that are less 
obviously the domain of the executive branch, such as rulemaking or 
advisory opinions, also have been placed outside of Congress’s purview.  
The Supreme Court has held that while these tasks are not, strictly 
speaking, enforcement activities, they are close enough to make them 
executive responsibilities and too far from Congress’s legislative duties.226  
Agency procedures abide by procedural due process, so adjudications must 
be fair and unbiased,227 although an agency can itself investigate claims, 
prosecute them, and adjudicate them, provided there is a division of labor 
within the agency.228  The due process constraints on agency institutional 
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design229 are therefore modest; in the absence of specific evidence that the 
adjudication is biased or likely to be biased, courts do not disturb the 
agency’s structure on due process grounds.230 
In short, the limitations the Constitution places on agency institutional 
design are nowhere near as restrictive as those it places on campaign 
finance regulation.  For the latter, the regulation must be closely tailored to 
a compelling government interest, and after Citizens United, the regulation 
must address the anticorruption interest as the Court has narrowly defined 
it.  On the other hand, the Supreme Court has upheld institutional 
arrangements that it acknowledged were “unquestionably . . . peculiar,” 
explaining that “[o]ur constitutional principles of separated powers are not 
violated . . . by mere anomaly or innovation.”231  Like modified rational 
basis review, institutional design is a readily available tool that can be used 
to address concerns arising from campaign financing. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY 
In this part, we step back and address a natural objection to our 
constrictive argument:  that the proposals for treating the ills of campaign 
finance that we are putting forth are undemocratic in the sense that they 
hand policymaking over to actors who are not elected or responsive to the 
voters.  Modified rational basis review authorizes courts to supplant the 
choices made by elected officials, though circumscribed by the doctrine, 
and some of the institutional design options described above entail taking 
policymaking out of the hands of the legislature and giving it over to 
agencies that are less responsive to the voters.  We address this concern in 
this part and argue that it is misplaced. 
Concerns about these proposals’ impact on democracy are reasonable, 
and, in connection with rational basis review, where such arguments have 
been articulated most extensively, it is the principal justification for the 
doctrine as it has evolved into its modern form.  Rational basis review is 
usually extraordinarily deferential.  Courts adopt this standard due to 
judicial restraint232 and the separation of powers,233 concluding that it is not 
the appropriate role of judges to intervene simply when they think a policy 
is ill-advised.  It is the democratic process that is supposed to correct such 
policies, a view that is sometimes read into the Constitution.234  In run-of-
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the-mill cases, then, “[f]or protection against abuses by legislatures the 
people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.”235 
Still, while the concern with the democratic status of our proposals may 
be reasonable, it is ultimately misplaced.  The argument for this position we 
develop here has several elements, some relevant across our proposals, 
others more specific to individual details.  A key common point of 
departure is that in cases where our constructive arguments have the most 
impact, there are good reasons to believe that there is a breakdown in the 
democratic process.  If the required threshold inquiry for modified rational 
basis review has been satisfied, then there is evidence that the elected 
official is likely to respond to the interests of campaign contributors instead 
of her constituents.  Likewise, our proposals seek to prevent interest groups 
from being able to exercise disproportionate and systematic control over 
policymaking (although there are other reasons to design agencies with 
those features),236 control that cannot be easily reversed or corrected by a 
democratic process.  The consequence is that the relevant comparison is not 
between a democratic institution237 (such as a legislature) and an 
undemocratic one (such as a federal court or independent agency).  The 
actual comparison is not nearly so straightforward, and in these instances, it 
is not clear that the choices of elected officials should automatically be 
privileged over those of courts or agencies, for there is something 
undemocratic on both sides of the ledger. 
This logic—that when the democratic process is not functioning properly 
then the usual prohibitions on actions like judicial intervention have less 
bite—underwrites Baker v. Carr238 and Carolene Products’ footnote 
four.239  The same logic also underwrites modified rational basis review, 
and that review is entirely consistent with democracy. 
When the democratic process cannot, directly or indirectly, provide an 
effective check on the government’s power, courts adopt a more active 
stance.  One of the clearest statements of this principle was made in Baker 
v. Carr, where the Supreme Court opted to wade into the “political thicket” 
to rule on a Tennessee state legislature apportionment scheme: 
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I would not consider intervention by this Court into so delicate a field if 
there were any other relief available to the people of Tennessee.  But the 
majority of the people of Tennessee have no “practical opportunities for 
exerting their political weight at the polls.”  I have searched diligently for 
other practical opportunities present under the law.  I find none other than 
through the federal courts . . . .  We therefore must conclude that the 
people of Tennessee are stymied . . . without judicial intervention.240 
When the usual democratic processes, to which the courts normally would 
defer, are defective or unavailable, then courts are willing to intervene as 
something of a last resort.  Similarly, courts frequently have intervened to 
“clear[] the channels” of the democratic process241 and ensure a well-
functioning democracy.242 
These same principles motivate Carolene Products footnote four,243 
which also holds that courts should step in when there are defects in the 
political process.  As one commentator describes Carolene Products:  “The 
governing principle is that decisions are made by the democratic process.  
The Court should intervene only if that process is blocked in some way.”244  
Carolene Products established a form of bifurcated review:  in ordinary 
cases, any legislation is presumed to be constitutional, but when there is a 
breakdown in the political process, courts treat the legislation more 
critically.  Modified rational basis review takes the same approach, 
tightening judicial scrutiny when the political process has, to some degree, 
failed.  The difference between Carolene Products’s bifurcated review and 
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modified rational basis review is how such democratic failures are 
identified (although they are by no means mutually exclusive), and, in this 
regard, modified rational basis review has some advantages. 
Carolene Products focuses on laws that disadvantage “discrete and 
insular minorities” on the theory that they do not have effective recourse to 
the political process.  Even if the minority takes to the polls, the theory 
goes, it could not defeat a law that disadvantages it.  This reasoning has 
been criticized, though.245  A minority, especially a discrete and insular 
one, may have substantial organizational advantages, which translate into 
greater success—disproportionate to its modest population—in the political 
arena.246  A smaller group will have an easier time overcoming collective 
action problems,247 and an insular community may have social institutions 
that make information easy to spread.248  A minority voting bloc may also 
find itself as pivotal swing voters,249 making it very influential.  None of 
these factors guarantee that a minority will possess enough influence to see 
its preferred policies implemented or protect itself from policies that are to 
its disadvantage.  A minority may be too small or resource-poor to wield 
substantial influence.  But, it does indicate that the mapping from “discrete 
and insular minority” to “political vulnerability” is imperfect.  This, in turn, 
means that the standard formulation of Carolene Products requires judges 
to be amateur political scientists and evaluate the relative political power of 
various groups, a task to which they are not well-suited.250 
Modified rational basis review works in a fashion similar to Carolene 
Products—courts should presume a policy is constitutional unless the 
political process appears to have failed—but does not rely on the 
generalizations about minorities in that decision that have drawn criticism.  
Rather than the heuristic put forward in Carolene Products, the first step in 
modified rational basis review is to determine whether in this particular 
case the democratic process is functioning properly.  Only after this 
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threshold finding is made would the policy be subject to relatively rigorous 
scrutiny.  Modified rational basis review is thus in a good position to 
deliver on the goals of Carolene Products footnote four, while avoiding 
some of the difficulties they have in the implementation.  It also is 
consistent with Baker v. Carr and similar precedents. 
Two additional factors limit modified rational basis review’s 
undemocratic consequences.  First, while modified rational basis review is, 
when it applies, stricter than the usual rational basis standard, it is not 
prohibitively so.  To survive review, all that needs to exist is some public 
purpose that the policy serves.  We do not propose to limit the set of 
legitimate state interests,251 and a law should not be overturned here just 
because a court can conceive of a better or more efficient way to achieve 
the law’s stated purpose.  That is, the fit between the purpose and the policy 
need not be perfect, recognizing that much of public policy is incremental 
and the product of compromise.  Therefore, the heightened review does not 
grant judges license to change policy to suit their own preferences or 
conceptions of the good. 
Second, the threshold finding that the elected official might be swayed by 
campaign funds is fairly demanding.  The facts of Caperton were “extreme 
by any measure.”252  Blankenship spent more than all of Benjamin’s other 
supporters combined, triple the amount that Benjamin’s own campaign 
spent, in a close election the results of which would directly affect his 
company.253  Under those circumstances, it is easy to conclude that the 
possibility that the newly elected Justice Benjamin might be beholden to 
Blankenship should be taken seriously.  These facts are not necessary to 
trigger modified rational basis review—Caperton lays out a series of 
factors, not a definitive minimum—but any run-of-the-mill involvement in 
a campaign does not suffice.  It will take substantial expenditures (relative 
to the size of the election), a close contest, and so forth to trigger the stricter 
standard of review, and so the first step in this review should screen out 
many cases. 
Turning to institutional design, the view that a decision by the “people’s 
branch” to delegate power to an executive agency harms democracy 
presupposes a certain—highly contestable—view of representation.  To 
start with, the President is, of course, an elected official and both the 
executive and the legislative policymaking institutions fit within a broadly 
democratic framework.  However, the institutions differ in important ways.  
While individual legislators are closer to their constituents, and, in that 
sense, are more proximate representatives of their interests,254 these 
legislators’ official decisions can affect a group much larger than their 
electoral constituency:  a congressional committee chair can exercise 
substantial power in lawmaking that affects voters throughout the nation 
while being answerable only to the voters within her own district.  While 
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Congress, as a whole, has a broad national constituency, a given member of 
it does not.  In contrast, the President is accountable to a national 
constituency and stands more plausibly as a proximate representative of that 
broader constituency than any other official.255  Indeed, as we argued 
above, it is precisely that difference in constituencies that can make the 
office of the President less susceptible to the influence of narrow interests. 
Even aside from looking to the policymakers’ immediate constituency, 
the assessment of the institutions with respect to their “democraticness” is 
probably best pursued at the system level rather than the component 
level.256  Thus, for example, in suggesting that agency independence can be 
a useful substitute for campaign finance regulation and controlling the 
influence of money in politics, we do not mean to imply that it is always, or 
necessarily, a good idea—no more than relatively searching judicial review 
would be.  Both are useful tools in specific circumstances.  When 
appropriate, they are a means to achieve the public’s goals, despite being 
undemocratic in the narrow sense that policy is being made by unelected 
actors.  In the broader sense, their intent and effect is ultimately democracy 
enabling.  By mitigating the pathologies of money in politics, these post-
electoral mechanisms increase the actual and effective practice of 
democratic governance and make politics more responsive to the voters writ 
large.  And both the Framers of the Constitution257 and the courts258 have 
recognized that achieving that goal may involve intervention by less 
obviously or directly democratic institutions.  There is also some indication 
that voters may view such intervention favorably.259 
CONCLUSION 
Money has the potential to undermine the democratic process by 
conferring outsized influence on those willing and able to spend it.  At the 
same time, attempts to regulate money in politics must be balanced against 
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commitments to freedom of speech.  In Citizens United, the Supreme Court 
made comprehensive campaign finance regulation, at least in its traditional 
form, unworkable.  Under the current doctrine, the Constitution bars 
attempts to effectively keep money out of the electoral system.  
Recognizing this doctrine, and its implicit limits, we have proposed an 
alternative approach to the issue—mitigating the effects of money in 
politics by means that operate later in the policymaking process.  In this 
Article, we detail two applications of the alternative approach:  (1)  
modified rational basis review, and (2)  the design of policymaking 
institutions to be more resilient to the distortions caused by large campaign 
expenditures.  This downstream approach has three main virtues.  First, 
because it does not infringe on free speech, it is not unconstitutional.  
Second, it relies on legal tools that are already available.  Third, and closely 
related to the previous point, it is practically achievable.  Courts already 
possess the means to respond to cases where campaign expenditures 
undermine the democratic process, while delivering on the ideals embodied 
in decisions like Carolene Products.  Furthermore, there is substantial 
latitude for choosing the specific features of policymaking institutions, 
which can moderate the influence of campaign expenditures on the resulting 
policies.  In the wake of the restrictions placed on direct regulation of 
campaign finance, we should turn our attention to ameliorating the effects 
of campaign expenditures on policy rather than eliminating those 
constitutionally protected expenditures. 
